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Political connections with corrupt government bureaucrats and corporate M&A 
decisions: A natural experiment from the anti-corruption cases in China 
Abstract  
Using 29 recent high level anti-corruption cases in China as a natural experiment, we examine 
the patterns in merger and acquisition (M&A) decisions and performance in Chinese non-state 
owned enterprises (non-SOEs) before and after the exogenous severing of political 
connections. We identify a set of listed related non-SOEs whose managers bribed or had 
connections, through past working and educational experience, with corrupt bureaucrats from 
2005 to 2011. We document that, after the arrest of corrupt bureaucrats, corruption related non-
SOEs lose their competitive advantages in the M&A market. We observe a significant 
reduction in the likelihood of conducting M&As and the ability to access local and state-owned 
targets for these firms. They pay a higher takeover premium and consequently have worse post-
M&A performance. Our results are robust when we exclude bribing firms, and firms whose 
related corrupt bureaucrats are arrested within a year before the announcement of the M&A. 
Furthermore, the influence of anti-corruption events varies across regions that have different 
levels of corruption index and industries with different levels of government support and 
competition. Overall, our study provides direct evidence to the question of why firms seek to 
establish connections with government officials through bribery or personal connections, and 
we reveal the benefits and costs of such connections.  
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Corruption is reported as a prevalent phenomenon around the world and is becoming an 
increasingly important concern for companies. The literature shows that corruption may bring 
various benefits to corruption-related firms, such as improving their efficiency (Beck and 
Maher, 1986), reducing transaction costs (Cheung et al., 2012), and giving better access to 
external financial markets (Fan et al., 2008), thus increasing firm value (Cheung et al., 2012; 
Karpoff et al., 2010). It is not surprising that the benefits of corruption are more important in 
emerging markets, because corruption compensates for the low quality of public governance 
and can therefore reduce its negative effect (Meon and Sekkat, 2005). That is why firms, 
especially non-state owned enterprises (non-SOEs), in emerging markets have a strong 
incentive to offer bribes to or form connections with government officials. In other words, 
corruption is an important channel through which firms establish political connections, and it 
brings direct benefits to the firms involved. However, given the illegality of corruption, the 
inherent uncertainty creates costs and may offset its value-enhancing mechanisms (Bardhan, 
1997; Meon and Sekkat, 2005). In particular, corruption-related firms may lose their 
connections with the corrupt bureaucrats after the corruption scandal is exposed, resulting in a 
significant political and operational risk to those firms. Therefore, an investigation into anti-
corruption events will enable us to better understand how political connections with corrupt 
government bureaucrats, through bribery or personal connections, influence corporate 
decisions. Moreover, an anti-corruption event is exogenous to firm decisions, which means that 
it could be used as a natural experiment to avoid a potential endogeneity issue (Fan et al., 2008; 
Cheung et al., 2012 and Fan et al., 2014). 
The literature on political connections shows that, in emerging markets such as China, where 
the government still has controlling power over firms’ access to financial resources and 
investment projects, politically connected managers play an important role in helping firms to 
2 
 
gain access to various financial resources, such as bank loans and the equity market (Faccio et 
al., 2006; Fan et al., 2008; Li et al., 2008 and Liu et al., 2013). However, these conventional 
studies generally use the current or former working experience of managers as government 
officials as a measure of firms’ political connections (Chen et al., 2011; Liu et al., 2013), and 
implicitly conjecture that politically connected managers enable connected firms to obtain 
benefits from the government through rent-seeking behavior. The drawbacks of this approach 
are: (1) the definition of political connections suffers from an endogeneity issue, although it is 
controlled; (2) while it is argued that politically connected managers tend to bring benefits to 
connected firms by seeking rent from the government, the channel is not identified.  
In this study, we hypothesize that firms establish political connections through bribery and 
personal connections with bureaucrats, which enables them to obtain profitable merger and 
acquisition (M&A) projects in China. In order to overcome the potential endogeneity issue, 
this study adopts an event study approach, which employs the high-level bureaucrat corruption 
scandal (provincial or higher) as a natural experiment. This approach was initiated by Fan et 
al. (2008) to avoid the confounding factors and endogeneity problems of cross-sectional 
studies, and has been empirically supported by Cheung et al. (2012) and Fan et al. (2014).  
In China, the arrest of high-level corrupt bureaucrats is exogenous to the firms (Fan et al., 
2008). In contrast to the municipal or lower level of corruption scandals, these high-profile 
corruption cases are typically exposed due to political strife or other reasons that have little to 
do with the business of the related firms. Given the weakness of the institutional environment 
and legal enforcement, the personal connection is expected to be more effective than a legal 
contract in China. The establishment of connections with political officials by offering bribes 
is a common and traditional business practice. Therefore, bribe taking is unlikely to be the 
direct and crucial reason for the arrest of high-profile government officials in China. Moreover, 
although anti-corruption enforcement is waged in the name of law and accountability, the 
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investigation is non-transparently operated beyond the law by a central government and party-
run agencies1. It is not difficult to see that the arrest of some high-profile bureaucrats is 
politically motivated, even though they are accused of bribe taking. Therefore, anti-corruption 
enforcement is largely exogenous for related firms: it is top down from the central government, 
politically motivated, and has little to do with the firms’ business operations or the actual 
bribery (Fan et al., 2014). Moreover, the detection of corruption cases is exogenous to related 
firms in China. The detection of corrupt bureaucrats is usually triggered by unrelated 
investigations in the cases of other government officials, by voluntary informers, 
whistleblowers, the bureaucrats’ mistresses or their political competitors, or private 
investigations by journalists. Cheung et al. (2012) conduct an empirical test and indicate that 
the detection of corruption is not related to the bribing firms. 
 Therefore, the exposure of corruption could serve as an exogenous shock, which unexpectedly 
breaks the connections between accused bureaucrats and the bribing firms. To provide a further 
robustness test, we identify personally connected firms, which are listed firms connected with 
corrupt government officials through their top managers’ former working affiliations and 
educational experience. These personally connected firms may not necessarily actively bribe 
corrupt bureaucrats; rather, they establish their connection through either their former working 
affiliations or educational experience. Therefore, any changes in their M&A decisions and 
post-M&A performance after the anti-corruption event should not be directly driven by the 
event itself but by their loss of connections, which largely evades the endogeneity issue.   
To conduct this natural experiment, we collected a sample of 29 corruption cases involving 
provincial or higher level bureaucrats in China during the period from 2005 to 2011, to 
investigate how the M&A decisions and performance of corruption-related firms are influenced 
1 For the detailed information, please refer to the article ‘The New Victims of China’s War on Corruption’ by 
The New York Times, http://cn.nytimes.com/china/20141020/c20corruption/en-us/.  
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by the anti-corruption event compared to unrelated firms. We classify listed firms into two 
types: (1) corruption-related firms (related firms), which include listed firms whose senior 
managers or directors have bribed corrupt bureaucrats (bribing firms), and listed firms whose 
senior managers or directors are connected with corrupt bureaucrats, through either their former 
working affiliations or educational experience (personally connected firms); and (2) unrelated 
firms, which include firms whose senior managers or directors have neither paid bribes nor 
been connected with corrupt bureaucrats. We examine how related firms’ M&A decisions and 
performance change, relative to these unrelated firms, after they lose their connections with the 
government in an anti-corruption event. We expect that, compared to unrelated firms, related 
firms may receive benefits from the M&A market by obtaining more quality targets, especially 
when the targets are controlled by the state, or when they conduct local M&A, which means 
the target firms are from the local M&A markets which are directly controlled by their related 
bureaucrats. They may also obtain other benefits when they conduct M&A, such as paying a 
lower M&A premium, and thus have a better post-M&A performance 2 . However, these 
benefits should disappear after these firms lose their connections in an anti-corruption event.  
As the largest emerging market, the capital market in China provides an ideal institutional 
environment in which to conduct our analysis. Firstly, China is recognized as a highly corrupt 
country. According to the Corruption Perception Index (CPI) from Transparency International, 
China ranked 75 out of 182 countries around the world in 20113. Moreover, La Porta et al. 
(2004) document that China is among the worst countries in terms of political freedom and the 
protection of property rights. The more direct evidence from the official reports of the Central 
2 For instance, the controlling shareholder of Thaihot Group Co (000732), Huang Qisen, is identified as a briber 
who bribed the former secretary-general of the CPC in Fujian province, Chen Shaoyong, who was involved in a 
corruption scandal and was arrested in 2008. In 2004, Mr Chen helped Mr Huang to acquire the state-owned 
shares of Fujian Mindong Electric Power Limited Company. In return, Mr Chen received a Patek Philippe watch 
as a gift from Mr Huang, which was worth 80,000 Hong Kong dollars.   
3 The CPI ranks countries and territories according to their perceived levels of public sector corruption. The 
index is ranked from the least corrupt country to the most corrupt country. For the detailed information, please 
refer to the CPI 2011 annual report by Transparency International, http://www.transparency.org/cpi2011/results.   
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Commission for Discipline Inspection of the Communist Party of China records that 643,759 
corruption cases were under investigation, 639,068 corruption cases were concluded, 668,429 
people were punished by the administrative and Party disciplinary agencies and 24,584 people 
were transferred to the judicial organs for further investigations, from the end of 2007 to 2012. 
There were 81,391 commercial bribery cases that were under investigation, and more than 20 
billion Chinese yuan were involved in these cases. This huge number of corruption cases not 
only provides opportunities to conduct our studies, but also reveals the importance and 
prevalence of having connections with government officials in China. Furthermore, the 
network (so-called ‘Guanxi’) is regarded as one of the most important and dominant factors in 
business operations in China, rather than formal contracts (Xin and Pearce, 1996). Under this 
institutional environment, the impacts of informal social connections such as political 
connections are enhanced.  
Secondly, the Chinese government still has a great capacity to intervene directly in firms’ 
M&As at the various levels. For instance, while the Chinese economy has transformed from a 
government-controlled to a market-oriented economy, local governments still retain the right 
to allocate various resources through licensing, granting the right of land use and access to the 
capital market (Cull and Xu, 2003; Firth et al., 2009; Li et al., 2009 and Chen et al., 2011). 
Moreover, M&A deals must obtain permission from local governments if they relate to a state-
owned enterprise (SOE). Under these circumstances, Chinese firms will have a strong incentive 
to build connections with bureaucrats through bribery or hiring connected managers. These 
political connections will facilitate the M&A process and also create value when they conduct 
M&As. Therefore, we expect that firms which have paid bribes and formed connections with 
bureaucrats will have superior post-M&A performance before the corrupt bureaucrats are 
arrested, but that their post-M&A performance will decline significantly after the event. 
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Lastly, in contrast to SOEs, which by nature have a close relationship with the government, 
non-SOEs are more likely to establish connections with the government through bribery, due 
to the continuing rule of the Communist Party and ideological discrimination against non-
SOEs. Therefore, we expect that an anti-corruption event should have a more pronounced 
influence on the M&A decisions and performance of non-SOEs compared to SOEs.   
Using a sample of 383 M&A announcements in Chinese publicly listed non-state controlled 
firms (non-SOEs) from 2005 to 2011, we conducted a series of empirical tests to provide 
evidence for our hypotheses. Our results confirm that related firms, including bribing firms and 
personally connected firms, are more likely to conduct M&As than unrelated firms before the 
anti-corruption events, and that the likelihood of conducting M&As in these related firms 
declines significantly after the arrest of corrupt bureaucrats. The likelihood of acquiring a local 
target and state-owned firm decreases more significantly for related non-SOEs than for 
unrelated firms after the arrest of corrupt bureaucrats. Moreover, related non-SOEs pay a higher 
takeover premium after the breaking of their connections. Consistently, the post-M&A 
performance of related non-SOEs, as measured by the short-term cumulative abnormal returns 
(CARs) around announcement date and long-term buy-and-hold returns, is significantly worse 
than that of the unrelated private firms subsequent to the arrest of the corrupt government 
officials. Overall, our results suggest that Chinese non-SOEs do benefit from bribing and 
connecting with corrupt bureaucrats, by having better access to the M&A market and paying 
lower M&A premiums, which results in a good post-M&A performance. However, this 
superior performance in the M&A market disappears when such connections are broken as a 
result of an anti-corruption event.  
Our robustness results further show that the impact that the anti-corruption event has on post-
M&A performance varies across regions and industries: the event has a greater impact on M&A 
transactions in highly corrupt regions, government-supported industries and industries which 
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are not very competitive. Finally, our results are robust to the M&A deals conducted by firms 
with longer-term connections with government officials, and are immune to the argument that 
better quality firms are more likely to have political connections and be able to conduct value-
enhancing M&As.  
This study contributes to the literature in the following ways. Firstly, our study extends the 
current literature on M&A decisions and performance. Previous studies in this area mainly 
focus on the effect of firm-specific and industry factors on M&A performance (Moeller et al., 
2004; Faccio and Masulis, 2005; Dong et al., 2006; Rhodes-Kropf et al., 2005; Masulis et al., 
2007; Cai and Sevilir, 2012; Ishii and Xuan, 2014). By using anti-corruption events in China 
as a natural experiment, which greatly alleviates the endogeneity issue, we provide direct 
evidence that, in emerging markets with poor shareholder protection and high levels of 
government intervention, public sector governance has an important influence on firms’ M&A 
decisions and performance. Therefore, we add new evidence to this strand of the literature.  
Our study also contributes to the literature on political connections. In particular, previous 
studies mainly focus on the effect of political connections on firm value and the ability to access 
external financial markets (Fisman, 2001; Johnson and Mitton, 2003; Khwaja and Mian, 2005). 
We extend these studies by investigating how political connections affect firms’ M&A 
transactions. More importantly, in previous studies, the firm’s political connections are usually 
measured by managers’ previous working experience in governments. Our study adopts a more 
direct measure of political connections: i.e. firms that form relationships with corrupt 
government officials either through direct bribery or by personal connections. By showing that 
related firms conduct more (less) M&As, pay a (lower) higher M&A premium, and have 
(better) worse post-M&A performance before (after) the anti-corruption event, we provide 
direct evidence of the benefits and costs of the political connections in Chinese non-SOEs. 
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The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 develops our hypotheses. Section 
3 introduces our data, sample, variables and the empirical model employed. Section 4 presents 
the empirical results and interpretations. Section 5 summarizes and concludes this paper.  
2. Hypothesis development  
2.1. The arrest of corrupt bureaucrats and corporate M&A decisions   
2.1.1. The arrest of corrupt bureaucrats and likelihood of conducting M&As 
As discussed in the previous section, the Chinese capital market is known for its high degree 
of government intervention and discrimination against private firms. The government and 
politicians implicitly shape and control the daily operations of non-SOEs through regulations, 
licenses and political networks (Piotroski and Zhang, 2014). This encourages Chinese non-
SOEs to establish political connections with local government officials in order to seek rents 
from the government and to overcome ideological discrimination. The Chinese M&A market 
is characterized by a high level of intervention by the local governments and authorized 
government agencies. Therefore, non-SOEs have a strong incentive to bribe or connect with 
local government bureaucrats in exchange for obtaining better access to the M&A market and 
gaining competitive advantages. However, when the related corrupt bureaucrats are under 
investigation or arrested, such political connections are broken. Thus, the preferential access to 
the M&A market will disappear. Therefore, we predict that the likelihood of conducting M&As 
for related non-SOEs will decrease significantly subsequent to the arrest of corrupt bureaucrats. 
Based on the above analysis, we hypothesize that:  
H1a: The likelihood that related (bribing or personally connected) non-SOEs will conduct 
M&A deals will significantly decrease after the arrest of corrupt bureaucrats.        
2.1.2. The arrest of corrupt bureaucrats, and the likelihood that non-SOEs will conduct 
local M&As or merge with SOE targets 
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As discussed above, corrupt bureaucrats help related non-SOEs to gain access to the M&A 
market. However, the power of bureaucrats is often limited by geographic distance, which 
means that related firms will be more likely to acquire targets that are located in the 
jurisdictions of their connected bureaucrats. Therefore, we expect that related non-SOEs will 
be more likely to conduct local M&As. However, their ability to access the local M&A market 
will decrease after the arrest of corrupt bureaucrats. 
As the manager and controlling shareholder of SOEs, local government has the ultimate right 
to make decisions and is better able to directly and easily influence the operational activities in 
these firms than in private firms. Moreover, due to the weak legal protection and lack of 
monitoring by the supervisory agencies of state-owned assets, government officials may utilize 
their control right over SOEs for their private benefit. Thus the related non-SOEs are more 
likely to obtain quality state-owned assets than are the unrelated firms. However, the breaking 
of connections by anti-corruption enforcement terminates their preferential treatment. We thus 
expect that related non-SOEs will experience a significant decline in the likelihood of acquiring 
a state-owned target subsequent to anti-corruption enforcement. Therefore, we hypothesize 
that:  
H1b: The likelihood that related (bribing or personally connected) non-SOEs will acquire a 
local target and/or state-owned target will significantly decrease after the arrest of corrupt 
bureaucrats. 
2.1.3. The arrest of corrupt bureaucrats and takeover premium  
In the previous section, we argue that related non-SOEs would have a preference in accessing 
the M&A market. Another possible benefit that related non-SOEs might obtain through bribery 
or connecting with government bureaucrats is to acquire target firms by paying a lower M&A 
premium. By bribing or connecting with local bureaucrats, the acquirers may have the chance 
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to learn the true value of target firms and reduce the information asymmetry in the deals. 
Moreover, through government intervention, the corrupt bureaucrats may even influence the 
managers/shareholders of the target firms to accept the offer from related firms to merge with 
their firms at a relatively lower price. Thus, we argue that political connections with 
government bureaucrats will reduce the takeover premium for related non-SOEs. However, 
subsequent to the arrest of corrupt local bureaucrats, related non-SOEs will lose their 
connections and have to pay a higher premium than before. Thus our next hypothesis is: 
H1c: The takeover premium for related (bribing or personally connected) non-SOEs will 
significantly increase after the arrest of corrupt bureaucrats. 
2.2. The arrest of corrupt bureaucrats and post-M&A performance  
As discussed above, by forming relationships with government bureaucrats through bribery or 
personal connections, non-SOEs may obtain good M&A opportunities but pay a relatively low 
M&A price, and thus their M&A activities are more likely to be value-creating. However, after 
corrupt government bureaucrats are dismissed, the non-SOEs might conduct more value-
destroying M&A activities, as they might lose the various kinds of assistance from the corrupt 
bureaucrats with whom they had relationships. Therefore, it is expected that related non-SOEs 
will have better post-M&A performance before an anti-corruption event is announced, while 
such good performance should decrease after local bureaucrats are arrested. Therefore, we 
develop our hypothesis as follows:  
H2: The post-M&A performance of related (bribing or personally connected) non-SOEs will 
significantly decrease after the arrest of corrupt bureaucrats.     
3. Methodology and measurement of variables  
3.1. Cases of bureaucratic corruption 
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To test our hypotheses, we manually collected a list of corruption cases, which include Chinese 
bureaucrats at provincial level or higher, and identify the listed firms whose senior managers 
or directors have directly bribed, or had connections through past working and educational 
experience with, the corrupt government officials. As discussed earlier, we only focus on 
corruption cases involving high-level government officials (provincial level and above) to keep 
our study free from endogeneity issues. We employed the following process to collect the 
corruption cases. Firstly, we collected a list of corrupt government officers from 2005 to 2011 
from the Central Commission for Discipline Inspection of the Communist Party of China, and 
three other government websites: people.cn, huanqiu.com and xinhua.net. These websites are 
sponsored by the People’s Daily, which is the official newspaper of the Chinese government. 
We further made efforts to extend our list of corruption cases from other well-known websites 
in China, such as ifeng.com, sina.com.cn, and NetEase. In order to identify the bribing firms 
in our corruption cases, we kept only corruption cases that have been reported in detail by the 
Legislative Affairs Office of the State Council P. R. China or in the bulletin of the Supreme 
People’s Procuratorate of the People’s Republic of China. These resources usually report 
detailed information about the people who have offered bribes to corrupt bureaucrats and the 
firms that have been illegally assisted by corrupt bureaucrats. Ultimately, we collected 29 high-
level corruption cases from 2005 to 2011.  
For all 29 of the corruption cases, we went through the reports published by the Legislative 
Affairs Office of the State Council P. R. China and the bulletin of the Supreme People’s 
Procuratorate of the People’s Republic of China to identify whether any of the listed firms 
(bribing firms) bribed the bureaucrats in question. We made further efforts to search through 
the above three official government news agencies and other available news services that 
disclose the investigation of these cases, to find out whether senior managers or directors of 
any of the other listed firms were involved in these corruption cases.  
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To identify the personally connected firms that are connected with the corrupt bureaucrats 
through working or educational affiliations but have not paid bribes or been involved in the 
corruption scandals, we searched through firms’ annual reports and initial public offer 
prospectuses and collected the profiles of senior managers and directors for each firm before 
the corruption event. Then we defined personally connected firms as those in which the firm’s 
senior managers or directors had previous working and educational affiliations with the corrupt 
government officers. The unrelated firms are the remaining listed firms, which neither paid 
bribes to nor had connections with the corrupt bureaucrats. 
Although we have made great efforts in the process of collecting corruption cases and 
identifying related firms, it is possible that we might have missed some related firms due to 
limited information. However, we have found that in China the extent of information disclosure 
about corruption cases involving corrupt bureaucrats, and the firms involved in these cases, is 
similar among all corruption cases. Therefore, any missing data are more likely to be random 
and less likely to influence our results. This bias would only weaken the significance level of 
our findings. In contrast to Fan et al. (2008), we do not limit our research to firms that are 
located in the corrupt bureaucrats’ jurisdictions, but focus on all listed firms in the Shanghai 
and Shenzhen stock exchanges, in order to avoid missing any related firms. However, we have 
also constructed a sample that only includes firms located in the jurisdictions of the corrupt 
government officers. We find that our results still hold when using this latter sample. A list of 
the corruption events is reported in Appendix A. 
3.2. Sample 
The sample used in this paper includes the M&A deals conducted by publicly listed non-SOEs 
on the Shanghai and Shenzhen stock exchanges from 2005 to 2011. We used the CSMAR 
China Listed Firms’ M&A Database to obtain announcement dates, information about 
acquiring and target firms, and M&A financial information for completed deals in our sample 
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period. We also collected other information from a series of datasets from the CSMAR 
database. This includes the China Stock Market Financial Statement Database from 2005 to 
2011; the China Listed Firms’ Corporate Governance Research Database from 2005 to 2011; 
and the China stock market trading database from 2004 to 2011. The CSMAR database is one 
of the most important and widely used databases in research on the Chinese capital market.  
Following previous studies in M&As, we require M&A deals to meet the following criteria. 
We require that the acquiring firm obtains at least 51% of the target shares, and omit M&A 
deals in which the acquiring firm already holds at least 51% of the target before the deal 
(Malmendier and Tate, 2008). Moreover, we exclude small transactions in which the deal value 
is less than 1% of the acquirer’s market capitalization (Cai and Sevilir, 2012; Masulis et al., 
2007). In order to make our calculation of M&A performance free from contamination from 
other announcements, we further exclude M&A announcements when the acquiring firms 
announce two or more M&A deals within three months, and announcements when the 
acquiring firms make other announcements during our event window. We require the acquirer 
to have information about their annual financial statement available (three years prior to 
acquisition announcements and three years post these announcements) and stock return data 
(280 trading days prior to M&A announcements) from CSMAR databases. Finally, we exclude 
those deals for which information about the acquiring or target firm, the announcement date 
and financial data are missing. After meeting these criteria, our final sample yields 383 M&A 
cases from a total of 4,875 firm year observations. 
3.3. Measurement of variables 
3.3.1. Corruption   
As discussed above, we define firms as having connections with the government when they 
have paid bribes or are connected with corrupt bureaucrats. These related firms (bribing firms 
14 
 
and personally connected firms) are defined by a dummy variable ‘CORRUPTION’, which 
equals one if the firm commits bribery or is connected with a corrupt government officer. We 
further include a dummy variable ‘POST’, which equals one if the M&A deal is conducted 
after the corruption event. The emphasis of this study is on the interaction term 
‘CORRP*POST’. This interaction term picks up changes in the related firms’ M&A decisions 
and performance after the corruption event, relative to those of the unrelated firms. We 
expected that this interaction would be significantly negatively related to post-acquisition 
performance and positively associated with takeover premium in non-SOEs, while it would be 
insignificant in SOEs.  
3.3.2. Other variables  
A series of variables are constructed to measure firms’ M&A decisions and post-M&A 
performance. We first define a dummy variable ‘M&A’, which is equal to one if the firm 
conducts an M&A in a given year, to measure the likelihood of conducting an M&A.  
The short-term post-M&A performance is measured by the three-, five- and 11-day post-M&A 
cumulative abnormal market-adjusted stock returns (CARs). We calculate the abnormal return 
in the M&A announcement period by using the standard event study methodology of Brown 
and Warner (1985). The estimation period is 250 trading days, which starts from 280 trading 
days prior to the event date for each M&A announcement in our sample. Over this estimation 
period, the daily returns of firms making an M&A announcement are regressed on the value-
weighted market return on the Shanghai and Shenzhen stock exchanges. The daily abnormal 
return is defined as the difference between the actual daily return and market model expected 
daily return using the estimated factor loadings from these regression results. We cumulate the 
daily abnormal returns over the event windows (-1 to 1, -2 to 2 and -5 to 5), to measure the 
abnormal performance upon M&A announcement. The long-term performance is measured by 
the one-, two- and three-year buy and hold stock returns (BHARs).  
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We use two variables to measure the takeover premium. ‘PREMIUM1’ is a relative measure 
defined as the total dollar premium (measured by trading value minus fair value of the target 
firm’s equity value) relative to the fair value of the target firm’s equity value. ‘PREMIUM2’ 
is defined as the natural logarithm of the dollar premium. 
We expect that connected firms are more likely to conduct acquisitions that are under the 
corrupt bureaucrats’ control. Thus, we also collect the target firms’ location data and define a 
dummy variable (LOCAL), which equals 1 if the acquiring and target firm are located in the 
same province. We collect the target firms’ ownership data and define a dummy variable 
(Target SOE), which equals 1 if the target is controlled by the state.  
To conduct our regression analysis, we also include various control variables in our regression 
models to control for factors that may affect M&A performance. The definitions of these 
variables are reported in detail in Appendix B.  
3.4. Regression model and research design 
We use the following equation as the baseline regression model to test our hypotheses: 
𝑀𝑀&𝐴𝐴 /𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐴𝐴𝐿𝐿/𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇 𝑆𝑆𝐿𝐿𝑆𝑆/𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑆𝑆𝑀𝑀𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑀𝑀/𝑃𝑃𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑇𝑇𝑃𝑃𝑇𝑇𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑇𝑇/
= 𝛼𝛼0 + 𝛽𝛽1 × 𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑇𝑇𝑃𝑃𝐿𝐿𝐶𝐶𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡 + 𝛽𝛽2 × 𝑃𝑃𝐿𝐿𝑆𝑆𝑇𝑇𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡 + 𝛽𝛽3 × 𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃 × 𝑃𝑃𝐿𝐿𝑆𝑆𝑇𝑇𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡 + 𝛽𝛽4
× 𝐿𝐿𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑃𝑃𝑙𝑙 𝑉𝑉𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑉𝑉𝑇𝑇𝑉𝑉𝑙𝑙𝑇𝑇𝑉𝑉𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡+𝛽𝛽5 × 𝑌𝑌𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇 𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝐷𝐷+𝛽𝛽6 ×  𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝐼𝐼𝐷𝐷𝑉𝑉𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝐷𝐷 𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝐷𝐷
+ 𝜀𝜀                                                                                                                   ① 
In equation 1, the dependent variables are: ‘M&A’ dummy variable; Local M&A dummy 
variable; Target SOE dummy variable; takeover premium; and post-M&A performance. All 
control variables are as defined in Appendix B. We also include a set of year and industry 
dummy variables to control for the year and industry fixed effects.  
To examine how related firms’ M&A decisions and post-M&A performance change after the 
arrest of corrupt bureaucrats, we firstly employ our full sample to run the above regression 
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model. For the robustness check, we then repeat the main regression analyses, using the sample 
of firms that are located in the corrupt government officers’ jurisdictions. In order to eliminate 
the concern that our results are mainly driven by the bribing firms, we thirdly remove the 
bribing firms from our sample and repeat the analysis for the impact of anti-corruption events 
on M&A decisions and performance for personally connected firms only. We further limit our 
sample period to the years before the corruption scandals are exposed, and test the question 
whether corrupt government officers provide benefits to related firms when they conduct 
M&As. Finally, we limit our sample to those firms which have longer-term connections with 
corrupt government officials, to eliminate the possibility that the anti-corruption enforcements 
are caused by these M&A deals.   
4. Empirical results  
4.1. Summary statistics and univariate tests 
4.1.1 Summary statistics 
Table 1 presents the summary statistics for our main variables. The results show that the 
proportion of related non-SOEs accounts for 14% of our full sample. We find that the 
proportion of M&A deals conducted by related non-SOEs amounts to 21% of sample. The high 
proportion of related firms reveals the importance of being connected with local governments 
in China. For the M&A performance of acquiring firms, our results show that the shareholders 
of acquiring firms earn a slightly positive return (about 3%) around the announcements, with a 
relatively high long-term post-acquisition performance after conducting the acquisition deals. 
The proportions of local acquisitions and acquisitions of a state-owned target amount to 54% 
and 12%, respectively, out of the 383 acquisitions from 2005 to 2011. We also find that 
acquiring firms are willing to pay a high premium to secure the controlling rights of the target, 
which is demonstrated by the positive value of PREMIUM1 (the average PREMIUM1 is 2.8, 
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which means that firms pay on average 2.8 times the estimated fair value of the target). In this 
study, the target value is relatively small compared to that of the bidding firms, which is only 
about 52% of the acquirer’s market value. In our sample, almost 87% of M&As in China are 
completed by cash payment rather than share payment, which is much higher than in developed 
countries like the US. Ishii and Xuan (2014) show that purely cash deals were only about 32% 
in the US from 1999 to 2007.  
<Table 1> 
4.1.2. Univariate test 
The univariate test results are reported in Table 2. The difference-in-difference method is used 
to test the changes in M&A characteristics before and after the corruption events. Panel A 
presents the results of the impact of corruption events on the likelihood of conducting M&As. 
Panels B and C show the univariate test results for the effects of corruption events on the 
likelihood of conducting local M&As and acquiring a state-owned target. Panel D tabulates 
univariate test results for the impact of a corruption event on the takeover premium. The results 
for the influence of corruption events on post-M&A performance are reported in Panel E.  
As shown in Panel A, we find the likelihood of related non-SOEs conducting M&As is 
significantly higher than their unrelated counterparts, before the corruption scandals are 
exposed, while the difference becomes insignificant after the arrest of corrupt bureaucrats. 
Moreover, after the corruption events, related non-SOEs have a significantly reduced 
likelihood of conducting M&As. Overall, the results support our hypothesis H1a. 
The results in Panels B, C and D show that related non-SOEs are more likely to acquire local 
and state-owned firms and pay a lower takeover premium than unrelated firms, before the 
corruption event (1.21 vs. 2.16). Moreover, we find that after the arrest of corrupt bureaucrats, 
the likelihood of related non-SOEs acquiring a local and state-owned firm drops significantly, 
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and the takeover premium of related non-SOEs is significantly higher than that of unrelated 
non-SOEs. These results reveal that related non-SOEs lose the ability to access the local M&A 
market after they lose their connections with government officials, which confirms our 
hypotheses H1b and H1c.  
In Panel E of Table 2, we find that the difference in post-M&A performance between related 
non-SOEs and unrelated non-SOEs is significant and positive before the arrest of corrupt 
bureaucrats. After the corruption event, the post-M&A performance of related non-SOEs 
declines significantly compared to that of unrelated firms. These findings suggest that being 
connected with corrupt bureaucrats results in M&As conducted by related firms having 
superior performance before the event, while this outstanding performance disappears on 
losing their political connections after the event. The results in Panel B confirm hypothesis H2. 
<Table 2> 
4.2 Regression analysis  
We next conduct a regression analysis to examine whether the M&A decisions and post-M&A 
performance of related firms change after the arrest of corrupt bureaucrats, as we expect, when 
we control for other factors that are identified as having an influence on M&A decisions and 
performance.   
4.2.1 Anti-corruption events and M&A decisions 
4.2.1.1 Anti-corruption events and the likelihood of conducting M&As 
Our regression analysis begins by investigating the impact of the anti-corruption events on the 
likelihood of conducting M&A deals. Column 1 of Table 3 presents the results. As per our 
expectations, the estimated coefficient of the related firms, ‘CORRUPTION’, is significantly 
positively associated with the likelihood that non-SOEs will conduct M&As, suggesting that 
related non-SOEs conduct more M&As in general. We are particularly interested in the 
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interaction term ‘CORP*POST’, which demonstrates how the likelihood of related firms 
conducting M&As changes after the arrest of corrupt bureaucrats. Our results show that the 
coefficient of the interaction term, ‘CORP*POST’, is significant and negative. The marginal 
effect of the arrest of corruption bureaucrats for the related firm is -0.053. This indicates that 
the predicted probability that related non-SOEs conduct M&As decreases by 5% subsequent 
to the arrest of bureaucrats.  
For robustness, we limit our sample to firms that are located in the corrupt bureaucrats’ 
jurisdictions around the anti-corruption events, and the results are reported in Column 4 of 
Table 3. The results are consistent with our previous findings. Overall, our results in Table 3 
confirm our hypothesis H1a. 
4.2.1.2 The impact of anti-corruption events on local acquisitions 
Columns 2 and 4 of Table 3 present the results for the effect of corruption events on the related 
firms’ decision to conduct local M&As. We expected that related non-SOEs would be more 
likely to conduct local M&As, since the corrupt bureaucrats would have more power to 
influence commercial activities under their jurisdictions. From those columns, we find that 
related non-SOEs are more likely to conduct local M&As than their unrelated counterparts. 
Given that the acquirers are more likely to take advantage of a nearby target’s resources and 
achieve a better post-M&A performance, this result also supports our expectations of a better 
post-M&A performance in related non-SOEs. More importantly, we demonstrate that the 
ability of related non-SOEs to acquire a local target is weakened after the arrest of corrupt 
bureaucrats. Therefore, the results support our hypothesis H1b regarding acquisition decisions.  




Local government officials have the direct controlling power over state-owned assets and can 
easily influence decisions in SOEs. Being connected with bureaucrats, the related non-SOEs 
have a higher probability of obtaining quality state-owned assets. We thus expect that the 
related non-SOEs are more likely to acquire a state-owned target firm than unrelated firms. 
However, the ability to access quality state-owned targets weakens subsequent to the arrest of 
corrupt bureaucrats. The empirical results are tabulated in columns 3 and 6 of Table 3. We find 
that the coefficient of ‘CORP*POST” is significantly negative for the likelihood of acquiring 
a state-owned target. Our results reveal that the probability of acquiring an SOE target declined 
13% in related private firms subsequent to the anti-corruption enforcement.  
<Table 3> 
Overall the results in Table 3 support our argument. The breaking of connections with local 
bureaucrats weakens the related non-SOEs’ ability to access the M&A market and acquire 
quality targets.   
4.2.1.4 The impact of anti-corruption events on takeover premium 
In this subsection, we investigate the effect of corruption events on takeover premium. Our aim 
is to shed light on whether corrupt bureaucrats help related firms in M&A deals by avoiding 
overpayment to a target. Our expectation is that anti-corruption events will significantly 
increase the M&A premium for related non-SOEs. The results are reported in Table 4.  
The results in Table 4 show that the estimated coefficient of ‘CORRUPTION’ is significantly 
negatively associated with takeover premium. These results confirm that related non-SOEs in 
general pay less to the target in M&As. In addition, the coefficient of the interaction term, 
‘CORP*POST’, is significantly and positively related to the takeover premium whether we use 
all listed firms or firms located in the bureaucrats’ jurisdictions in our tests. This result reveals 
21 
 
that the capacity of related firms to avoid overpaying in M&As diminishes substantially after 
the anti-corruption event.   
In columns 2 and 4 of Table 4 we repeat our regression analysis by replacing the dependent 
variable as the natural logarithm of the M&A premium. The regression results are consistent 
with our previous findings.  
<Table 4> 
Overall, our results in Table 4 demonstrate that, by paying bribes or connecting with corrupt 
bureaucrats, related non-SOEs can avoid overpaying in acquisitions, while this capacity will 
be weakened following the anti-corruption events. These results also support our argument that 
related firms will have better performance in acquisitions, because paying too high a price for 
a target is the major reason why acquirers lose in M&As (Cai and Sevilir, 2012). Thus the 
results in Table 4 are consistent with our hypothesis H1c.  
4.2.2 Anti-corruption events and post-M&A performance 
Previous results show that anti-corruption events significantly affect the M&A decisions of 
related non-SOEs. However, it is not clear whether these firms will have a better M&A 
performance by bribing and connecting with corrupt bureaucrats, and how anti-corruption 
events may change this relationship. Tables 5 and 6 present the regression results for the impact 
of anti-corruption events on the short-term and long-term post-M&A performance, respectively.  
Table 5 shows that the estimated coefficient of ‘CORRUPTION’ is significantly positively 
associated with post-M&A performance, which is measured by the three-, five- and 11-day 
cumulative abnormal market adjusted return (CARs). More importantly, we find that the 
estimated coefficients of the interaction term between the related non-SOE dummy and the 
post corruption events dummy are consistently negative and are significant in both economic 
magnitude and statistical significance. Specifically, our result suggests that connection with 
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corrupt bureaucrats increases the related non-SOEs’ three-day CARs by 5% before the arrest 
of the corrupt bureaucrats, compared with the sample average of 3%. However, non-SOEs 
receive 7% (the sum of 0.051 and -0.119) worse market reactions subsequent to the anti-
corruption enforcement, which is about a 300% decrease in their short-term announcement 
return. These results reveal that the post-M&A performance of related non-SOEs is 
substantially worse after they lose their connections with government bureaucrats in the anti-
corruption event.  
The results of long-term post-M&A performance in Table 6 confirm our short-term post-M&A 
performance results. We find that, after the arrest of corrupt bureaucrats, related non-SOEs’ 
post-M&A long-term performance is significantly worse than before. The two-year buy and 
hold abnormal returns reduce by 73% subsequent to the arrest of bureaucrats in the corruption-
related non-SOEs.   
We repeat the above regression analyses by using the sample for the corrupt bureaucrats’ 
jurisdiction, and the results are reported in columns 4 to 6 of Tables 5 and 6. These results are 
consistent with the previous findings. Overall, these results confirm our hypothesis H2.  
<Table 5> 
<Table 6> 
4.3 Excluding the effect of bribing firms  
So far, we have provided substantial evidence to support our main hypotheses, that related non-
SOEs conduct fewer M&As, are less likely to acquire local and state-owned targets, pay a 
higher M&A premium, and have worse post-M&A performance, after they lose their 
connections in an anti-corruption event. However, it is possible that the previous results are 
mainly driven by the bribing firms: that the diminished performance in M&A transactions in 
related non-SOEs is driven by the bribery cases rather than loss of political connections. 
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Therefore, it would be helpful to investigate whether deteriorated M&A decisions and 
performance subsequent to the anti-corruption enforcement can be explained by the breaking 
of political connections alone. In order to do so, we repeat the above regressions using only the 
personally connected non-SOEs. These results are reported in Table 7.  
In Table 7, we present a set of regressions to test the impact of corruption events on the 
personally connected firms’ M&A decisions (Panel A), takeover premium (Panel B), and the 
short-term and long-term post-M&A market performance (Panels C and D). In this set of 
regressions, as bribing firms are excluded, the dummy variable ‘CORRUPTION’ is defined as 
being one where a firm’s senior managers or directors were a family member of, or have had 
previous work and education affiliations with, the corrupt government officers, but did not 
bribe them. Therefore, these personally connected non-SOEs only gain their connections by 
chance. From the regression results reported in Table 7, we find that the estimated coefficient 
of the interaction term, ‘CORP*POST’, is statistically significantly and negatively associated 
with the likelihood of conducting M&As, the probability of acquiring a local target and SOE 
target, and post-M&A performance, while significantly and positively associated with the 
takeover premium. These results demonstrate that, by losing political connections with the 
corrupt bureaucrats, personally connected non-SOEs will conduct fewer M&As, pay a higher 
premium, be less likely to acquire local targets and state-owned firms, and lose their 
preferential performance in the deals. All of these results confirm our previous findings. As a 
robustness check, we repeat the above regression models for the sample that only includes 
listed firms in the corrupt bureaucrats’ jurisdictions. The results are also consistent with the 
above findings; but, in order to save space, we do not report these results. To provide more 
robust results, we also limit our sample to those firms that have acquisition deals before and 





Overall, the results in this section confirm our main hypotheses that an anti-corruption event 
has a significant impact on the corporate M&A decisions of Chinese non-SOEs, in that related 
non-SOEs conduct fewer M&As, especially local M&As and state-owned targets, pay a higher 
M&A premium, and the M&As conducted by related non-SOEs have worse post-M&A 
performance after the arrest of corrupt bureaucrats. Our results hold even when the firms have 
connections but do not bribe the corrupt bureaucrats, suggesting that the diminished M&A 
performance in related non-SOEs is not solely caused by the corruption events, but is a result 
of losing political connections with these corrupt bureaucrats.  
4.4 Alternative interpretation 
Although previous sections provide solid evidence for the impact of corruption events on the 
M&A decisions of related firms, these results could have another interpretation. After the arrest 
of corrupt bureaucrats, the market and regulatory government agencies will have detailed 
information about the connected firms and bribers. Because of concerns about their reputation, 
the shareholders of quality target firms may refuse offers from related firms and government 
agencies may not be willing to approve M&A applications from related firms. Moreover, 
external financial markets may also refuse to provide financial support to these firms with bad 
reputations. Therefore, the lower likelihood of conducting M&As and weaker post-M&A 
performance subsequent to the anti-corruption event may not be driven by the loss of political 
connections, but by a bad reputation.  
To rule out the alternative interpretation, we further examine whether connections with corrupt 
government bureaucrats provide benefits to related firms in M&As before the arrest of these 
bureaucrats (before our event). To conduct this test, we repeat all our regression analyses but 
limit our sample period to the years before the corruption scandal erupted. We regress our main 
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dependent variables on the related firm dummy variable ‘CORRUPTION’, and control for 
other independent variables. We expect that related firms will have a high probability of 
conducting M&As, be more likely to conduct local M&A deals, pay a lower M&A premium, 
and have better post-M&A performance before the anti-corruption event. These results are 
reported in Table 8.  
As shown in Table 8, we find that the estimated coefficient of ‘CORRUPTION’ is significantly 
and positively associated with the likelihood of conducting M&As, the chances of conducting 
local M&As and acquiring a state-owned target (Panel A), and short-term and long-term post-
M&A market performance (Panels C and D), while the estimated coefficient of 
‘CORRUPTION’ is significantly negatively related to takeover premium in non-SOEs in Panel 
B. All of these results are consistent with our expectations and support our previous arguments. 
Overall, these results suggest that related non-SOEs are able to obtain various benefits from 
the corrupt bureaucrats before the corruption event. Therefore, the poorer acquisition 
performance subsequent to the corruption event is not entirely caused by the alternative 
interpretation about concern for reputation.    
<Table 8> 
4.5 Robustness tests for the corruption scandals 
In this study, we argue that the arrest of corrupt bureaucrats is a natural experiment and 
exogenous to the firms’ M&A decisions and performance. However, the potential issue for this 
argument is that the firms may actively bribe government officials when they plan to conduct 
M&As. Therefore, it is unclear whether their political connections lead to quality M&A deals. 
To rule out the potential explanation that firms may pay bribes to conduct M&A projects, we 
exclude M&A deals which are conducted by related firms that bribe bureaucrats within a year 
before the announcement of the M&A, and conduct an empirical analysis based on the sample 
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of M&As conducted by related firms with longer-term connections with local government 
officials before the event date, which are firms that build their connections with corrupt 
bureaucrats one year, two years and three years before the announcement of these M&As. The 
rationale is that longer-term relationships are less likely to be built temporarily in order to 
facilitate the M&As. We expect that the results are consistent with our previous findings, after 
excluding the deals conducted by related firms with shorter-term connections.  
As shown in Table 9, we find that the estimated coefficients of the interaction term 
‘CORP*POST’ are significantly and negatively related to the post-M&A performance in all 
subsamples. These results indicate that the related non-SOEs have significantly worse post-
M&A performance than those unrelated non-SOEs subsequent to the arrest of corrupt 
government officials when the connections are established one year (columns 1 to 3), two years 
(columns 4 to 6) and three years (columns 7 to 9) before the announcement of these M&As. 
Therefore, the results are consistent with our previous findings and do not support the 
alternative explanation that the purpose of bribing and connecting with government officials is 
to conduct future M&As.  
<Table 9> 
Another potential issue for our previous findings is that profitable firms are able to conduct 
more value-enhancing M&As. At the same time, they can afford the cost of bribing local 
government officials and are more likely to build political connections. To rule out this 
potential interpretation in our results, we partition our sample by the sample median value of a 
firm’s return on equity (ROE) and Tobin’s Q. We define quality firms as those firms that have 
higher ROE or Tobin’s Q. If our results can be explained by the above interpretation, we would 
expect that the significantly negative relationship between the interaction term “CORP*POAT’ 
and post-M&A performance in non-SOEs can only be observed in the subsample of high-
quality firms. From Table 10, we find that the estimated coefficients of ‘CORP*POST’ are 
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both significantly and negatively associated with the post-M&A performance in both low and 
high-quality firms which are measured by the ROE and Tobin’s Q. Therefore, our results are 
immune from the above potential interpretation. Overall, the results presented in Tables 9 and 
10 indicate that the arrest of corrupt bureaucrats serves as a natural experiment and is 
exogenous to the related firms.   
<Table 10> 
4.6 Additional tests  
In order to provide additional evidence for our results, we further conduct the following tests: 
(1) we investigate whether the impact of anti-corruption events on corporate M&A decisions 
and performance differs between different regions and industries. China is characterized by 
great variation in terms of political and economic development in different regions and 
industries. In particular, there is great variation in terms of corruption in different provinces; 
and the level of government intervention in industry development and market competition also 
differs from province to province. Such variations provide us with an ideal setting to investigate 
whether corruption events have a different impact on corporate M&A decisions and the 
performance of related non-SOEs across different regions and industries. (2) Corrupt 
government officials are expected to have stronger and more direct control over the SOE target. 
We reveal that the likelihood that related non-SOEs will acquire SOE targets decreases 
significantly subsequent to the arrest of corrupt government officials, compared to that of 
unrelated non-SOEs. In this section, we further test whether the effect of the arrest of corrupt 
bureaucrats on M&A performance differs depending on whether the target is an SOE or a non-
SOE. (3) In addition to preferential access to the M&A market, corrupt government officials 
may help related non-SOEs finance their investment, while anti-corruption enforcement 
diminishes their financial competitive advantage in M&As. We thus investigate whether 
related non-SOEs are less likely to finance their M&As by external funds subsequent to the 
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exposure of corruption scandals. (4) M&As are a specific type of corporate investment, and so 
we further investigate how an anti-corruption event may impact on corporate investment policy 
and investment efficiency in general.  
4.6.1 The impact of anti-corruption events on corporate M&A performance across 
regions and industries 
We first examine the effect of anti-corruption events on corporate M&A performance in 
regions with different levels of corruption. As expected, related non-SOEs tend to obtain 
benefits from their related government bureaucrats through bribery or connecting before the 
event, and such benefits tend to disappear after the event, so it is further expected that the M&A 
performance of related non-SOEs should decrease more for firms operating in regions with 
high levels of corruption. To conduct this test, we collected the number of corruption cases 
from the Procuratorial Yearbook of China for each province from 2005 to 2011. Then we 
collected the number of government officials in each province who work in the departments 
that are related to public administration and social security from the China Statistical Yearbook 
and China Population and Employment Statistics Yearbook from 2005 to 2011. Then we scaled 
the number of corruption cases in each province by the number of government officials who 
work in the departments that are related to public administration and social organization. We 
define this ratio as the provincial corruption index. This index shows the level and importance 
of corruption in each province. The higher the corruption index the more severe the corruption 
is in a province. We thus rank the level of corruption in different provinces according to the 
provincial corruption index. Then we divide our non-SOE sample into two subsamples, non-
SOEs in regions with a high (low) corruption index; and conduct regressions on the effect of 
anti-corruption events on M&A decisions and performance in the two subsamples separately, 
and repeat our regressions on the effect of anti-corruption events on the post-M&A 
performance of non-SOEs using the two subsamples. Table 11 presents our regression results. 
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Not surprisingly, our results show that the M&A performance of related non-SOEs operating 
in highly corrupt regions (regions with a high corruption index) decreases significantly more 
than the subsample of related non-SOEs operating in less corrupt regions (regions with a low 
corruption index), which supports our expectation. 
<Table 11> 
We also expect that the influence of anti-corruption events on the post-M&A performance of 
corruption-related non-SOEs will be more pronounced if these firms operate in government-
supported industries and industries with less market competition. This is, firstly, because 
government-supported industries are usually subject to more direct intervention by local 
government officials. In particular, the Five-Year Plan is an important channel through which 
government intervention operates in industry development in China. These supported 
industries in each plan can conveniently obtain various kinds of support from the local or 
central government. Given that local government bureaucrats have the right to decide which 
firms within the supported industries are eligible to receive government support, such as tax 
refunds and preferential treatment in conducting M&As, the related non-SOEs within the 
supported industries are more likely to obtain government support and receive more benefits 
than their unrelated counterparts. Secondly, another channel through which the government 
intervenes in industries is the issuing of licenses to firms that permit them to enter into these 
restricted industries. This creates some industries with very low market competition because 
of the high level of government restrictions and the scarcity of licenses. At the same time, other 
industries are highly competitive because firms are able to freely access these markets. Having 
connections with the government through bribery or connecting with bureaucrats may help 
related non-SOEs gain access to certain restricted industries through M&As, but such benefits 
may disappear after firms lose such connections.  
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We therefore divide our non-SOEs into two pairs of subsamples: (1) government-supported 
industries versus non-government-supported industries, according to whether the firm operates 
in a supported industry outlined in the 11th five-year plan in a particular year; (2) less 
competitive industries versus highly competitive industries according to industry competition. 
Then we repeat our regressions on the effect of anti-corruption events on M&A performance, 
using the two pairs of subsamples.  
Panels A and B of Table 12 present the regression results. As expected, the empirical results 
support our expectation and suggest that our main results are robust. 
<Table 12> 
4.6.2 Anti-corruption events, type of target controlling shareholder and post-M&A 
performance  
In this section, we investigate whether the arrest of corrupt government officials has a different 
effect on the M&A performance of related non-SOEs depending on whether the target is an 
SOE or a non-SOE. Since corrupt bureaucrats often have stronger and more direct control over 
state-owned assets, they can sell quality SOEs to related non-SOEs, and force the SOE 
shareholders and managers to accept offers from related non-SOEs. There is anecdotal 
evidence that state-owned assets are leaked to privately controlled firms (Calomiris et al., 2010 
and Chen et al., 2008). However, the breaking of such connections after the arrest of corrupt 
government officials would terminate their superior performance in acquiring SOE targets. We 
thus expect that the reduction in post-M&A performance of related non-SOEs will be larger if 
the M&A involves an SOE target. The results in Table 13 support this argument. We find the 
impact of the arrest of corrupt bureaucrats is stronger if the deal involves a state-owned target 
firm. Our results in columns 3 and 4 indicate that the post-M&A performance of related non-




4.6.3 Anti-corruption events and financing method 
In this section, we investigate whether related non-SOEs’ superiority in financing M&As, 
compared to that of unrelated non-SOEs, is weakened subsequent to the arrest of corrupt 
bureaucrats. The empirical results are presented in Table 14. We define the dependent variable 
as equal to 1 if the M&A is financed by external funds, such as a bank loan, or the issuing of 
corporate bonds or shares, and 0 otherwise. The empirical results in Table 14 support our above 
argument. The probability that an M&A will be financed by external funds decreases by 11% 
in related non-SOEs after the arrest of corrupt bureaucrats.  
<Table 14> 
4.6.4 Anti-corruption events, corporate investment and efficiency 
In the previous sections, we show that related non-SOEs are able to obtain various benefits 
when conducting M&As, such as better opportunities to access the M&A market, paying a 
lower M&A premium, being more likely to acquire a local target and having a better post-
M&A performance, before the corruption event, but that all those benefits attenuate after the 
government bureaucrats are arrested. However, we still do not know how the anti-corruption 
event impacts on corporate investment policy and investment efficiency. In order to provide a 
full picture for our study, we further examine the impact of corruption events on firms’ 
investment and the investment efficiency of Chinese non-SOEs from 2005 to 2011. Because 
of the loss of connection with local governments as a result of the anti-corruption event, related 
non-SOEs lose their preferential access to the investment market and superior ability to obtain 
better investment projects. Therefore, we expect that related non-SOEs will have a significant 
reduction in their capital expenditure and investment efficiency after the arrest of corrupt 
bureaucrats. Tables 15 and 16 report the empirical results. 
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In Table 15, corporate investment is measured by the variable ‘CAPEXTA’, which is cash 
payments for fixed assets, intangible assets and other long-term assets from the cash flow 
statement, less the cash receipts from selling these assets scaled by the total assets. We find 
that the interaction term ‘CORRUPTION t-1*POST t-1’ is significantly and negatively 
associated with corporate investment in non-SOEs in both the full sample and the bureaucrats’ 
jurisdiction sample, and our results hold when we exclude bribing firms from our sample.  
<Table 15> 
In Table 16, corporate investment efficiency is measured by the sensitivity of corporate 
investment and investment opportunity (Tobin’s Q). Not surprisingly, our results show that the 
investment efficiency of related non-SOEs decreases significantly after an anti-corruption 
event.  
<Table 16> 
Overall, our robustness results provide further evidence that the impact of corruption events on 
corporate M&A performance is greater in highly corrupt regions, and in government-supported 
and less competitive industries. We also demonstrate that the anti-corruption event has a 
negative effect on corporate investment and investment efficiency. All these results support 
our main argument that, by bribing or connecting with local government bureaucrats, non-
SOEs are able to obtain various benefits when conducting M&As, while they lose all these 
benefits when the related government official is arrested in an anti-corruption event.    
4.7 The impact of anti-corruption events on M&A performance in SOEs 
In this section, we investigate the impact of anti-corruption events on the post-M&A 
performance of SOEs. In contrast to SOEs, the profit maximization motive leads non-SOEs in 
China to seek and maintain political connections only if the benefits from connection can offset 
its costs. However, the naturally close relationship between SOEs and government reduces the 
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benefits to be obtained from bribing corrupt government officials and weakens the incentive of 
SOEs to seek rent from local governments. More importantly, it may be more costly to maintain 
political connections with local governments in SOEs than in non-SOEs. In line with the 
‘grabbing hand’ theory, it is argued that political connections are the channel through which 
local governments exert intervention over listed SOEs for social objectives. Furthermore, 
managers may utilize their control over listed SOEs for their own purposes. The empirical 
results reveal that political connections cost firms by reducing investment efficiency, post-IPO 
performance and increasing social costs (Fan et al., 2007; Chen et al., 2011 and Fisman and 
Wang, 2015). Since the benefits of bribing the local government may be offset by additional 
costs from increased government interventions in SOEs, we expect that bribing corrupt 
government officials will not enhance the post-M&A performance of SOEs, and that we will 
not observe significant changes in their post-M&A performance after the arrest of these 
bureaucrats. The empirical results are presented in Table 17. As expected, we find that related 
SOEs are not observed to have a higher post-M&A performance than unconnected 
counterparties. Moreover, the arrest of corrupt bureaucrats does not have a significant effect 
on the M&A performance of SOEs.  
<Table 17> 
5. Conclusion 
This study examines how firms’ relationships with government bureaucrats, through bribery or 
personal connections, have an impact on corporate M&A decisions and performance in Chinese 
listed firms. Using cases of corrupt Chinese bureaucrats as a natural experiment, we manually 
collected corruption scandals involving high-level (provincial level or higher) Chinese 
government officials and identified the listed firms that bribed or connected with these 
bureaucrats. We find that related (bribing or personally connected) non-SOEs are able to obtain 
various benefits, such as having better access to the M&A market, paying a lower M&A 
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premium, and gaining better access to local and state-owned targets when conducting M&As, 
resulting in a better post-M&A performance, before the corruption scandals are exposed. 
However, all these benefits attenuate subsequent to the arrest of the corrupt bureaucrats in an 
anti-corruption event. We further provide evidence that the impact of the anti-corruption event 
on the corporate M&A decisions and performance of non-SOEs is greater in regions with a 
high corruption index, and in industries with government support and less market competition. 
The anti-corruption event is also identified as having a negative effect on the corporate 
investment and investment efficiency of related non-SOEs. Our results are also robust for 
various alternative interpretations. 
Overall, our findings suggest that in emerging markets with a high level of government 
intervention and ideological discrimination against non-SOEs, political connections, through 
bribery or personally connecting with government bureaucrats, have a great influence on M&A 
decisions and post-M&A performance in non-SOEs. This provides direct evidence for the 
importance of country level institutional factors on the determination of firms’ M&A decisions 
and post-M&A performance, without being influenced by the endogeneity of political 
connections. In particular, we document that firms in emerging markets tend to establish 
connections with the government through bribery and connecting with government officials 
specifically to maximize shareholder value, but at the same time such connections create risks 
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Table 1 Summary statistics 
Variables Name  Count Mean St. Dev.  25% 50% 75% 
CORRUPTION 4918 0.135 0.342 0.000 0.000 0.000 
POST 4918 0.542 0.498 0.000 1.000 1.000 
MA 4918 0.080 0.271 0.000 0.000 0.000 
JURISDICTION 4918 0.782 0.413 1.000 1.000 1.000 
SIZE 4918 21.055 1.127 20.434 21.010 21.693 
Q 4918 2.017 1.441 1.189 1.525 2.204 
OPCFTA 4918 0.031 0.207 -0.009 0.037 0.084 
LEVERAGE 4918 0.439 0.241 0.245 0.434 0.605 
CAPEXTA 4918 0.056 0.061 0.012 0.040 0.085 
SEO 4918 0.123 1.297 0.000 0.000 0.000 
AGE 4918 6.510 5.440 1.000 6.000 11.000 
BOARDSIZE 4918 8.668 1.666 8.000 9.000 9.000 
BOARDIND 4918 0.366 0.052 0.333 0.333 0.400 
OWNERSHIP 4918 0.060 0.134 0.000 0.000 0.029 
ROE 4698 0.074 0.109 0.040 0.078 0.122 
Local M&As 383 0.543 0.499 0.000 1.000 1.000 
Target SOE 383 0.120 0.326 0.000 0.000 0.000 
PREMIUM1 157 2.847 6.364 -0.018 0.000 0.333 
PREMIUM2 157 23.049 0.080 23.026 23.026 23.027 
CAR (-1, 1) 383 0.028 0.117 -0.022 0.009 0.050 
CAR (-2, 2) 383 0.032 0.115 -0.029 0.015 0.067 
CAR (-5, 5) 383 0.032 0.157 -0.035 0.012 0.086 
BHAR1 370 0.264 0.818 -0.118 0.066 0.411 
BHAR2 268 0.460 0.828 -0.049 0.289 0.695 
BHAR3 191 0.863 1.228 0.138 0.492 1.361 
External Financing 338 0.107 0.309 0.000 0.000 0.000 
RELATIVE SIZE 383 0.520 2.127 0.009 0.024 0.077 
CASH PAYMENT 383 0.872 0.334 1.000 1.000 1.000 
Connection established  
one year before 383 0.984 0.124 1.000 1.000 1.000 
Connection established  
two years before 383 0.974 0.160 1.000 1.000 1.000 
Connection established  
three years before 383 0.966 0.181 1.000 1.000 1.000 
Corruption Index 383 0.511 0.500 0.000 1.000 1.000 
Government Support 383 0.198 0.399 0.000 0.000 0.000 
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Table 2 Univariate tests  
‘Related Firms’ (‘Unrelated Firms’) represents firms that have (have not) bribed or connected with local 
government officials. ‘Before’ and ‘After’ represent the period before and after the arrest of corrupt 
bureaucrats, respectively. The definitions of variables are detailed in Appendix B.   
  Related Firms Unrelated firms Difference test 
  Mean  Median  Mean  Median  t value  z value 
Panel A The likelihood of conducting mergers and acquisitions  
Before 0.157 - 0.064 - 0.093*** - 
After 0.096 - 0.079 - 0.017 - 
  0.061** - -0.015* - 0.076*** - 
Panel B The likelihood of conducting local acquisitions   
Before 0.809 - 0.476 - 0.333*** - 
After 0.471 - 0.534 - -0.063 - 
  0.338*** - -0.058 - 0.396*** - 
Panel C The likelihood of acquiring SOE targets 
Before 0.361 - 0.089 - 0.272*** - 
After 0.030 - 0.096 - -0.066 - 
 0.331***  -0.007 - 0.338*** - 
Panel D Takeover premium      
Before 1.213 0.000 2.155 0.000 -0.942 0.000 
After 7.416 0.000 2.912 0.000 4.504** 0.000* 
  -6.203*** 0.000* -0.757 0.000 -5.446**   
Panel E The short term post-M&A performance    
CAR (-1, +1)      
Before 0.086 0.027 0.027 0.011 0.059** 0.016* 
After -0.02 -0.001 0.021 0.009 -0.041*** -0.010*** 
 0.106 0.028 0.006 0.002 0.100***  
       
CAR (-2, +2)      
Before 0.09** 0.039*** 0.03 0.005 0.060*** 0.034*** 
After -0.029 -0.021 0.031 0.021 -0.060*** -0.042*** 
 0.119*** 0.06*** -0.001 -0.016 0.120***  
       
CAR (-5, +5)      
Before 0.042 0.066 0.033 0.003 0.009 0.063* 
After -0.046 -0.02 0.044 0.014 -0.09*** -0.034*** 






Table 3 Regression results for the impact of corruption events on M&A decisions  
This table presents logistic regression results for the impact of corruption events on M&A decisions. ‘FULL’ includes all listed firms in the Shenzhen and 
Shanghai stock exchanges and ‘JURISDICTION’ only includes firms under corrupt bureaucrats’ jurisdictions. The dependent variable ‘M&A’ is binary where 
1 signifies that the firm makes at least one merger bid that is eventually successful in a given year. The dependent variable ‘Local M&As’ is binary where 1 
signifies that the firm acquired a local target within the successful M&A deals. The dependent variable ‘Target SOE’ is binary where 1 signifies that the target 
firm is controlled by the state within the successful M&A deals. ‘CORRUPTION’ is a dummy variable that is equal to one if a firm is a related firm, and zero 
otherwise. ‘POST’ is a dummy variable that is equal to one if the observation is obtained after the year of the corruption event, otherwise zero. ‘CORP*POST’ 
is the interaction between ‘CORRUPTION’ and ‘POST’. Control variables are defined in Appendix B, and the standard errors are clustered by firm to account 
for any possible correlations between firms. The value reported is the marginal effect of independent variables; p-values in parentheses. *, **, *** represent 
significance at 10%, 5% and 1% levels, respectively.  
  FULL  JURISDICTION 
  M&A Local M&A Target SOEs  M&A Local M&A Target SOEs 
CORRUPTION  0.080*** 0.341*** 0.204***  0.136*** 0.317*** 0.232*** 
 (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)  (0.00) (0.00) (0.01) 
POST 0.007 0.101 0.052  0.006 0.055 0.081 
 (0.54) (0.14) (0.24)  (0.71) (0.51) (0.11) 
CORP*POST -0.053*** -0.342*** -0.134**  -0.052*** -0.325** -0.145** 
 (0.00) (0.00) (0.01)  (0.01) (0.02) (0.02) 
SIZE 0.028*** -0.034 0.021  0.029*** -0.050 0.034* 
 (0.00) (0.34) (0.24)  (0.00) (0.19) (0.09) 
Q 0.017*** -0.036 0.005  0.013*** -0.024 0.009 
 (0.00) (0.12) (0.74)  (0.01) (0.39) (0.58) 
OPCFTA 0.051 0.42 0.261  0.104* 0.285 0.167 
 (0.28) (0.13) (0.18)  (0.08) (0.33) (0.50) 
LEVERAGE -0.004 -0.041 0.068*  -0.003 -0.143* 0.160*** 
 (0.26) (0.60) (0.09)  (0.37) (0.10) (0.01) 
BOARDSIZE -0.005 0.014 0.014  -0.005 0.020 0.018 
 (0.14) (0.40) (0.16)  (0.17) (0.29) (0.17) 
BOARDIND -0.015 -0.525 -0.061  -0.050 -0.372 0.227 
 (0.87) (0.34) (0.84)  (0.65) (0.57) (0.60) 
OWNERSHIP -0.070 0.379 0.183  -0.051 0.298 0.318 
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 (0.25) (0.17) (0.30)  (0.41) (0.34) (0.12) 
INTERCEPT -10.915*** 2.241 -9.288*  -12.292*** -9.353** -27.237*** 
 (0.00) (0.53) (0.08)  (0.00) (0.02) (0.00) 
YEAR YES YES YES  YES YES YES 
INDUSTRY YES YES YES  YES YES YES 
N 4875 376 380  3826 300 297 






Table 4 Regression results for the impact of corruption events on M&A premium  
This table presents the regression results for the impact of corruption events on firms’ takeover 
premium. ‘FULL’ includes all listed firms in the Shenzhen and Shanghai stock exchanges and 
‘JURISDICTION’ only includes firms under corrupt bureaucrats’ jurisdictions. The dependent variable 
‘PREMIUM1’ is defined as the ratio of M&A premium to estimated fair value of equity of target firm. 
The dependent variable ‘PREMIUM2’ is defined as the natural logarithm of the difference between the 
trading value and the estimated value of the target. ‘CORRUPTION’ is a dummy variable that is equal 
to one if a firm is a related firm, and zero otherwise. ‘POST’ is a dummy variable that is equal to one if 
the observation is obtained after the year of the corruption event, otherwise zero. ‘CORP*POST’ is the 
interaction between ‘CORRUPTION’ and ‘POST’. Definition of control variables is in Appendix B, 
and the standard errors are clustered by firm to account for any possible correlations between firms. 
Standardized beta coefficients; p-values in parentheses. *, **, *** represent significance at 10%, 5% 
and 1% levels, respectively. 
  FULL  JURISDICTION 
  PREMIUM1 PREMIUM2  PREMIUM1 PREMIUM2 
CORRUPTION  -2.171 -0.027*  -3.241 -0.030 
 (0.14) (0.08)  (0.13) (0.14) 
POST 0.222 -0.001  -2.345 -0.023 
 (0.85) (0.95)  (0.20) (0.12) 
CORP*POST 6.434** 0.056***  7.444** 0.064** 
 (0.02) (0.01)  (0.02) (0.01) 
RELATIVE SIZE -0.088 0.016***  -0.688 0.014*** 
 (0.85) (0.00)  (0.21) (0.00) 
CASH PAYMENT -1.671 -0.013  -0.951 -0.009 
 (0.22) (0.25)  (0.57) (0.51) 
SIZE 1.576* 0.018**  2.176*** 0.023*** 
 (0.05) (0.04)  (0.01) (0.01) 
Q 1.625** 0.004  2.911*** 0.008 
 (0.03) (0.30)  (0.01) (0.18) 
OPCFTA 10.082 0.117**  10.315 0.141** 
 (0.10) (0.03)  (0.11) (0.01) 
LEVERAGE 0.760 0.014  3.034* 0.028 
 (0.60) (0.36)  (0.08) (0.11) 
BOARDSIZE -0.338 -0.001  -0.390 -0.000 
 (0.29) (0.82)  (0.26) (0.90) 
BOARDIND -23.683** -0.153**  -17.435* -0.151* 
 (0.01) (0.05)  (0.05) (0.08) 
OWNERSHIP 10.860** 0.061  11.294** 0.067 
 (0.05) (0.13)  (0.04) (0.12) 
INTERCEPT -19.975 22.671***  -42.419** 22.550*** 
 (0.22) (0.00)  (0.04) (0.00) 
YEAR YES YES  YES YES 
INDUSTRY YES YES  YES YES 
N 157 157  126 126 
adj. R-sq 0.28 0.43  0.32 0.39 
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Table 5 Regression results for the impact of corruption events on firms’ short-term post-M&A performance.  
This table presents the regression results for the impact of corruption events on firms’ short-term post-M&A performance. ‘FULL’ includes all listed firms in 
the Shenzhen and Shanghai stock exchanges and ‘JURISDICTION’ only includes firms under corrupt bureaucrats’ jurisdictions. The dependent variable is 
post-M&A performance measured by CARs for three-day, five-day and 11-day windows (CAR (-1, 1), CAR (-2, 2) and CAR (-5, 5)). ‘CORRUPTION’ is a 
dummy variable that is equal to one if a firm is a related firm, and zero otherwise. ‘POST’ is a dummy variable that is equal to one if the observation is obtained 
after the year of the corruption event, otherwise zero. ‘CORP*POST’ is the interaction between ‘CORRUPTION’ and ‘POST’.  Definition of control variables 
is in Appendix B, and the standard errors are clustered by firm to account for any possible correlations between firms. Standardized beta coefficients; p-values 
in parentheses. *, **, *** represent significance at 10%, 5% and 1% levels, respectively. 
  FULL  JURISDICTION 
  CAR (-1, 1) CAR (-2, 2) CAR (-5, 5)  CAR (-1, 1) CAR (-2, 2) CAR (-5, 5) 
CORRUPTION  0.051* 0.050** 0.002  0.012 0.013 -0.000 
 (0.10) (0.03) (0.95)  (0.33) (0.51) (0.99) 
POST 0.016 0.030** 0.047**  0.016 0.034* 0.052** 
 (0.19) (0.04) (0.02)  (0.24) (0.09) (0.04) 
CORP*POST -0.119*** -0.133*** -0.093**  -0.065*** -0.083*** -0.083** 
 (0.01) (0.00) (0.03)  (0.00) (0.00) (0.02) 
RELATIVE SIZE 0.012*** 0.016*** 0.024***  0.014*** 0.018*** 0.025*** 
 (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)  (0.00) (0.00) (0.01) 
CASH PAYMENT -0.033 -0.056** -0.075**  -0.061** -0.076** -0.088** 
 (0.12) (0.04) (0.02)  (0.01) (0.02) (0.02) 
SIZE 0.003 0.012** 0.028***  0.004 0.014** 0.024** 
 (0.56) (0.04) (0.01)  (0.30) (0.01) (0.01) 
Q 0.008* 0.016*** 0.029***  0.008* 0.018** 0.024** 
 (0.09) (0.01) (0.00)  (0.07) (0.01) (0.04) 
OPCFTA 0.011 0.020 -0.091  -0.010 -0.001 -0.053 
 (0.79) (0.68) (0.16)  (0.77) (0.99) (0.40) 
LEVERAGE -0.012 -0.023 -0.034  -0.037*** -0.050*** -0.065* 
 (0.39) (0.16) (0.25)  (0.00) (0.00) (0.07) 
BOARDSIZE -0.006 -0.004 0.004  0.000 0.001 0.004 
 (0.14) (0.37) (0.51)  (0.98) (0.86) (0.43) 
BOARDIND 0.051 0.044 0.085  0.120 0.085 -0.090 
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 (0.52) (0.61) (0.51)  (0.13) (0.48) (0.63) 
OWNERSHIP 0.061 0.061 0.023  0.050 0.062 0.045 
 (0.17) (0.26) (0.69)  (0.24) (0.28) (0.51) 
INTERCEPT 0.259 -0.057 -0.742***  -0.088 -0.331** -0.505** 
 (0.39) (0.79) (0.01)  (0.40) (0.02) (0.03) 
YEAR YES YES YES  YES YES YES 
INDUSTRY YES YES YES  YES YES YES 
N 383 383 383  303 303 303 
adj. R-sq 0.25 0.33 0.34  0.40 0.39 0.31 
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Table 6 Regression results for the impact of corruption events on firms’ long-term post-
M&A performance.  
This table presents the regression results for the impact of corruption events on firms’ long-term post-
M&A performance. ‘FULL’ includes all listed firms in the Shenzhen and Shanghai stock exchanges 
and ‘JURISDICTION’ only includes firms under corrupt bureaucrats’ jurisdictions. The dependent 
variable is post-M&A long-term market performance measured by buy and hold stock returns for one-
year, two-year and three-year windows (BHAR1, BHAR 2 and BHAR3). ‘CORRUPTION’ is a dummy 
variable that is equal to one if a firm is a related firm, and zero otherwise. ‘POST’ is a dummy variable 
that is equal to one if the observation is obtained after the year of the corruption event, otherwise zero. 
‘CORP*POST’ is the interaction between ‘CORRUPTION’ and ‘POST’.  Definition of control 
variables is in Appendix B, and the standard errors are clustered by firm to account for any possible 
correlations between firms. Standardized beta coefficients; p-values in parentheses. *, **, *** represent 
significance at 10%, 5% and 1% levels, respectively. 
  FULL  JURISDICTION 
  BHAR1 BHAR2 BHAR3  BHAR1 BHAR2 BHAR3 
CORRUPTION  0.161 0.355 0.443  0.226 0.363 0.505 
 (0.44) (0.19) (0.12)  (0.42) (0.24) (0.17) 
POST -0.004 0.130 0.111  0.026 0.184 0.174 
 (0.97) (0.33) (0.63)  (0.85) (0.29) (0.57) 
CORP*POST -0.290 -0.734** -1.210***  -0.379 -0.690* -1.234*** 
 (0.19) (0.02) (0.00)  (0.22) (0.08) (0.00) 
RELATIVE SIZE 0.091 0.135** 0.072  0.144** 0.165** 0.005 
 (0.18) (0.02) (0.20)  (0.01) (0.01) (0.97) 
CASH PAYMENT -0.171 0.066 0.087  -0.175 0.004 0.124 
 (0.29) (0.78) (0.76)  (0.39) (0.99) (0.75) 
SIZE 0.073 -0.029 -0.322**  0.097** -0.090 -0.488** 
 (0.11) (0.68) (0.04)  (0.01) (0.31) (0.02) 
Q -0.015 -0.089 -0.288**  0.017 -0.108 -0.262 
 (0.65) (0.13) (0.01)  (0.57) (0.23) (0.12) 
OPCFTA -0.453 -0.490 -0.170  -0.833** -0.749 -0.446 
 (0.20) (0.30) (0.88)  (0.02) (0.20) (0.76) 
LEVERAGE -0.064 -0.260 0.205  -0.272 -0.568** 0.461 
 (0.59) (0.16) (0.51)  (0.10) (0.05) (0.56) 
BOARDSIZE 0.039 0.006 -0.003  0.029 0.036 0.036 
 (0.21) (0.92) (0.97)  (0.38) (0.55) (0.69) 
BOARDIND -0.400 0.083 -1.094  -0.434 0.921 0.469 
 (0.63) (0.95) (0.53)  (0.63) (0.66) (0.87) 
OWNERSHIP -0.374 -1.103 1.130  -0.523 -1.683* 0.069 
 (0.13) (0.11) (0.62)  (0.13) (0.07) (0.97) 
INTERCEPT -1.562 0.702 7.456**  -1.146 1.345 12.037*** 
 (0.18) (0.65) (0.02)  (0.33) (0.49) (0.01) 
YEAR YES YES YES  YES YES YES 
INDUSTRY YES YES YES  YES YES YES 
N 368 266 189  294 206 142 






Table 7 Anti-corruption events and M&A decisions: excluding the effect from bribing 
firms 
Panel A M&A decisions  
This table presents logistic regression results for the impact of corruption events on M&A decisions. 
Bribing firms are excluded in all regression models. The dependent variable ‘M&A’ is binary where 1 
signifies that the firm makes at least one merger bid that is eventually successful in a given year. The 
dependent variable ‘Local M&As’ is binary where 1 signifies that the firm acquired a local target within 
the successful M&A deals. The dependent variable ‘Target SOE’ is binary where 1 signifies that the 
target firm is controlled by the state within the successful M&A deals. ‘CORRUPTION’ is a dummy 
variable that is equal to one if a firm is connected with the corrupt bureaucrat through past job 
affiliations and educational experience but never bribed the corrupt bureaucrat, and zero otherwise. 
‘POST’ is a dummy variable that is equal to one if the observation is obtained after the year of the 
corruption event, otherwise zero. ‘CORP*POST’ is the interaction between ‘CORRUPTION’ and 
‘POST’.  The standard errors are clustered by firm to account for any possible correlations between 
firms. The value reported is the marginal effect of independent variables; p-values in parentheses. *, 
**, *** represent significance at 10%, 5% and 1% levels, respectively.  
  M&A Local M&A SOE Target 
CORRUPTION  0.139*** 0.357*** 0.224*** 
 (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
POST 0.009 0.112 0.063 
 (0.48) (0.10) (0.18) 
CORP*POST -0.059*** -0.369*** -0.133** 
 (0.00) (0.00) (0.02) 
SIZE 0.031*** -0.047 0.018 
 (0.00) (0.23) (0.32) 
Q 0.017*** -0.037 0.006 
 (0.00) (0.13) (0.65) 
OPCFTA 0.064 0.419 0.257 
 (0.21) (0.13) (0.19) 
LEVERAGE -0.005 0.005 0.078* 
 (0.20) (0.95) (0.07) 
BOARDSIZE -0.005 0.015 0.014 
 (0.18) (0.40) (0.15) 
BOARDIND 0.002 -0.525 -0.099 
 (0.98) (0.34) (0.75) 
OWNERSHIP -0.065 0.368 0.180 
 (0.27) (0.19) (0.31) 
INTERCEPT -12.047*** 3.285 -7.081 
 (0.00) (0.39) (0.16) 
YEAR YES YES YES 
INDUSTRY YES YES YES 
N 4564 367 367 









Panel B Takeover premium 
This table presents the regression results for the impact of corruption events on firms’ takeover 
premium. Bribing firms are excluded in all regression models. The dependent variable ‘PREMIUM1’ 
is defined as the ratio of M&A premium to estimated fair value of equity of target firm. The dependent 
variable ‘PREMIUM2’ is defined as the natural logarithm of the difference between the trading value 
and the estimated value of the target. ‘CORRUPTION’ is a dummy variable that is equal to one if a 
firm is connected with the corrupt bureaucrat through past job affiliations and educational experience 
but never bribed the corrupt bureaucrat, and zero otherwise.  ‘POST’ is a dummy variable that is equal 
to one if the observation is obtained after the year of the corruption event, otherwise zero. 
‘CORP*POST’ is the interaction between ‘CORRUPTION’ and ‘POST’. The standard errors are 
clustered by firm to account for any possible correlations between firms. Standardized beta coefficients; 
p-values in parentheses. *, **, *** represent significance at 10%, 5% and 1% levels, respectively. 
  PREMIUM1 PREMIUM2 
CORRUPTION  -2.532 -0.025* 
 (0.10) (0.10) 
POST -0.051 0.000 
 (0.97) (0.99) 
CORP*POST 6.634** 0.059*** 
 (0.02) (0.01) 
RELATIVE SIZE -0.177 0.017*** 
 (0.72) (0.00) 
CASH PAYMENT -1.550 -0.012 
 (0.25) (0.26) 
SIZE 1.959** 0.016* 
 (0.03) (0.10) 
Q 1.897** 0.003 
 (0.03) (0.60) 
OPCFTA 9.007 0.124** 
 (0.13) (0.02) 
LEVERAGE -1.451 0.023* 
 (0.39) (0.08) 
BOARDSIZE -0.414 -0.000 
 (0.20) (0.95) 
BOARDIND -22.782** -0.146* 
 (0.02) (0.06) 
OWNERSHIP 10.279* 0.061 
 (0.05) (0.14) 
INTERCEPT -27.481 22.768*** 
 (0.12) (0.00) 
YEAR YES YES 
INDUSTRY YES YES 
N 154 154 









Panel C Short-term post-M&A performance 
This table presents the regression results for the impact of anti-corruption events on the short-term post-
M&A performance of related firms. Bribing firms are excluded in all regression models. The dependent 
variable is post-M&A performance measured by CARs for three-day, five-day and 11-day windows 
(CAR (-1, 1), CAR (-2, 2) and CAR (-5, 5)). ‘CORRUPTION’ is a dummy variable that is equal to one 
if a firm is connected with the corrupt bureaucrat through past job affiliations and educational 
experience but never bribed the corrupt bureaucrat, and zero otherwise. ‘POST’ is a dummy variable 
that is equal to one if the observation is obtained after the year of the corruption event, otherwise zero. 
‘CORP*POST’ is the interaction between ‘CORRUPTION’ and ‘POST’. The standard errors are 
clustered by firm to account for any possible correlations between firms. Standardized beta coefficients. 
P-values in parentheses. *, **, *** represent significance at 10%, 5% and 1% levels, respectively. 
  CAR (-1, 1) CAR (-2, 2) CAR (-5, 5) 
CORRUPTION  0.056* 0.051** 0.004 
 (0.09) (0.03) (0.88) 
POST 0.019 0.033** 0.049** 
 (0.13) (0.03) (0.01) 
CORP*POST -0.129** -0.135*** -0.084* 
 (0.01) (0.00) (0.08) 
RELATIVE SIZE 0.014*** 0.019*** 0.031*** 
 (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
CASH PAYMENT -0.028 -0.052* -0.056* 
 (0.22) (0.07) (0.07) 
SIZE -0.002 0.005 0.013 
 (0.74) (0.47) (0.16) 
Q 0.007 0.013** 0.022*** 
 (0.15) (0.03) (0.01) 
OPCFTA 0.019 0.035 -0.067 
 (0.64) (0.49) (0.27) 
LEVERAGE 0.002 0.003 0.020 
 (0.90) (0.85) (0.34) 
BOARDSIZE -0.006 -0.004 0.003 
 (0.14) (0.36) (0.60) 
BOARDIND 0.056 0.061 0.133 
 (0.49) (0.48) (0.29) 
OWNERSHIP 0.055 0.054 0.008 
 (0.22) (0.32) (0.88) 
INTERCEPT 0.349 0.087 -0.473* 
 (0.27) (0.70) (0.08) 
YEAR YES YES YES 
INDUSTRY YES YES YES 
N 374 374 374 










Panel D Long-term post-M&A performance 
This table presents the regression results for the impact of anti-corruption events on the long-term post-
M&A performance of related firms. Bribing firms are excluded in all regression models. The dependent 
variable is post-M&A long-term market performance measured by buy and hold stock return for one-
year, two-year and three-year windows (BHAR1, BHAR 2 and BHAR3). ‘CORRUPTION’ is a dummy 
variable that is equal to one if a firm is connected with the corrupt bureaucrat through past job 
affiliations and educational experience but never bribed the corrupt bureaucrat, and zero otherwise. 
‘POST’ is a dummy variable that is equal to one if the observation is obtained after the year of the 
corruption event, otherwise zero. ‘CORP*POST’ is the interaction between ‘CORRUPTION’ and 
‘POST’. The standard errors are clustered by firm to account for any possible correlations between 
firms. Standardized beta coefficients. P-values in parentheses. *, **, *** represent significance at 10%, 
5% and 1% levels, respectively. 
  BHAR1 BHAR2 BHAR3 
CORRUPTION  0.117 0.373 0.416 
 (0.59) (0.20) (0.15) 
POST 0.013 0.181 0.139 
 (0.89) (0.22) (0.55) 
CORP*POST -0.228 -0.627* -1.171*** 
 (0.35) (0.08) (0.00) 
RELATIVE SIZE 0.109 0.162*** 0.060 
 (0.13) (0.00) (0.29) 
CASH PAYMENT -0.144 0.102 0.035 
 (0.41) (0.68) (0.90) 
SIZE 0.028 -0.146 -0.322** 
 (0.51) (0.12) (0.04) 
Q -0.031 -0.131** -0.268** 
 (0.38) (0.04) (0.02) 
OPCFTA -0.349 -0.297 -0.163 
 (0.34) (0.54) (0.89) 
LEVERAGE 0.100 0.036 0.239 
 (0.19) (0.75) (0.45) 
BOARDSIZE 0.041 0.011 0.007 
 (0.17) (0.83) (0.92) 
BOARDIND -0.196 0.350 -1.005 
 (0.81) (0.81) (0.56) 
OWNERSHIP -0.405 -1.170* 1.279 
 (0.11) (0.09) (0.58) 
INTERCEPT -0.804 4.100* 7.416** 
 (0.47) (0.06) (0.02) 
YEAR YES YES YES 
INDUSTRY YES YES YES 
N 359 260 187 






Table 8 Regression results for the impact of corruption events on M&A decisions before 
the corruption event 
Panel A M&A decisions 
This table presents logistic regression results for the impact of corruption events on firms’ M&A 
decisions before the corruption events. The dependent variable ‘M&A’ is binary where 1 signifies that 
the firm makes at least one merger bid that is eventually successful in a given year. The dependent 
variable ‘LOCAL’ is binary where 1 signifies that the firm acquired a local target within successful 
M&A deals. The dependent variable ‘Target SOE’ is binary where 1 signifies that the target firm is 
controlled by the state within the successful M&A deals.  ‘CORRUPTION’ is a dummy variable that is 
equal to one if a firm is a related firm, and zero otherwise.  The standard errors are clustered by firm to 
account for any possible correlations between firms. The value reported is the marginal effect of 
independent variables; p-values in parentheses. *, **, *** represent significance at 10%, 5% and 1% 
levels, respectively.  
  M&A Local M&A SOE Target 
CORRUPTION  0.086*** 0.298*** 0.299*** 
 (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
SIZE 0.032*** 0.042 -0.016 
 (0.00) (0.36) (0.66) 
Q 0.028*** -0.029 0.050 
 (0.00) (0.44) (0.17) 
OPCFTA -0.042 1.000*** 0.890** 
 (0.52) (0.00) (0.03) 
LEVERAGE -0.012 0.126 -0.007 
 (0.29) (0.14) (0.93) 
BOARDSIZE -0.008 0.001 0.009 
 (0.11) (0.95) (0.70) 
BOARDIND -0.062 -0.993 -0.675 
 (0.66) (0.16) (0.30) 
OWNERSHIP 0.036 -0.012 -0.012 
 (0.78) (0.98) (0.99) 
INTERCEPT -12.515*** -4.596 2.664 
 (0.00) (0.39) (0.70) 
YEAR YES YES YES 
INDUSTRY YES YES YES 
N 2042 163 134 

















Panel B Takeover premium 
This table presents the regression results for the impact of corruption events on firms’ takeover premium 
before the corruption events. The dependent variable ‘PREMIUM1’ is defined as the ratio of total 
takeover premium to the fair value of equity of the target firm. ‘PREMIUM2’ is defined as the log of 
the total takeover premium measured by the difference between the sum of trading value of the target 
and the estimated fair value. ‘CORRUPTION’ is a dummy variable that is equal to one if a firm is a 
related firm, and zero otherwise.  The standard errors are clustered by firm to account for any possible 
correlations between firms. Standardized beta coefficients; p-values in parentheses. *, **, *** represent 
significance at 10%, 5% and 1% levels, respectively. 
  PREMIUM1 PREMIUM2 
CORRUPTION  -3.137* -0.023** 
 (0.05) (0.05) 
RELATIVE SIZE 0.774 0.020** 
 (0.16) (0.04) 
CASH PAYMENT -0.454 0.016 
 (0.85) (0.50) 
SIZE 0.573 -0.017 
 (0.49) (0.43) 
Q 0.049 -0.012 
 (0.96) (0.47) 
OPCFTA -3.130 0.189 
 (0.77) (0.41) 
LEVERAGE -0.212 0.017 
 (0.93) (0.48) 
BOARDSIZE -0.129 0.002 
 (0.81) (0.83) 
BOARDIND -6.363 -0.171 
 (0.76) (0.71) 
OWNERSHIP 22.078** 0.098 
 (0.01) (0.45) 
INTERCEPT -6.957 23.408*** 
 (0.74) (0.00) 
YEAR YES YES 
INDUSTRY YES YES 
N 60 60 
















Panel C Short-term post-M&A performance 
This table presents the regression results for the impact of corruption events on firms’ short-term post-
M&A performance before the corruption events. The dependent variable is post-M&A performance 
measured by CARs for three-day, five-day and 11-day windows (CAR (-1, 1), CAR (-2, 2) and CAR (-
5, 5)). ‘CORRUPTION’ is a dummy variable that is equal to one if a firm is a related firm, and zero 
otherwise. The standard errors are clustered by firm to account for any possible correlations between 
firms. Standardized beta coefficients; p-values in parentheses. *, **, *** represent significance at 10%, 
5% and 1% levels, respectively. 
  CAR (-1, 1) CAR (-2, 2) CAR (-5, 5) 
CORRUPTION  0.051 0.045* -0.004 
 (0.12) (0.06) (0.89) 
RELATIVE SIZE 0.012* 0.015** 0.024*** 
 (0.09) (0.03) (0.00) 
CASH PAYMENT -0.005 -0.030 -0.053 
 (0.87) (0.38) (0.16) 
SIZE -0.005 0.014 0.035** 
 (0.74) (0.32) (0.04) 
Q 0.011 0.024** 0.039*** 
 (0.22) (0.02) (0.00) 
OPCFTA 0.058 0.076 -0.088 
 (0.39) (0.42) (0.39) 
LEVERAGE -0.001 0.002 0.032 
 (0.96) (0.92) (0.23) 
BOARDSIZE -0.010 -0.008 0.005 
 (0.14) (0.24) (0.55) 
BOARDIND -0.061 -0.020 0.231 
 (0.65) (0.88) (0.19) 
OWNERSHIP 0.151* 0.114 -0.007 
 (0.08) (0.31) (0.95) 
INTERCEPT 0.610 0.030 -1.076** 
 (0.32) (0.94) (0.03) 
YEAR YES YES YES 
INDUSTRY YES YES YES 
N 171 171 171 

















Panel D Long-term post-M&A performance 
This table presents the regression results for the impact of corruption events on firms’ long-term post-
M&A performance before the corruption events. The dependent variable is post-M&A long-term 
market performance measured by buy and hold stock returns for one-year, two-year and three-year 
windows (BHAR1, BHAR2 and BHAR3). ‘CORRUPTION’ is a dummy variable that is equal to one 
if a firm is a related firm, and zero otherwise. The standard errors are clustered by firm to account for 
any possible correlations between firms. Standardized beta coefficients; p-values in parentheses. *, **, 
*** represent significance at 10%, 5% and 1% levels, respectively. 
  BHAR1 BHAR2 BHAR3 
CORRUPTION  0.144 0.391* 0.572** 
 (0.52) (0.08) (0.04) 
RELATIVE SIZE -0.061 0.003 -0.024 
 (0.15) (0.97) (0.73) 
CASH PAYMENT -0.335 -0.040 0.155 
 (0.21) (0.90) (0.69) 
SIZE 0.057 -0.090 -0.234 
 (0.61) (0.48) (0.14) 
Q 0.065 0.015 -0.095 
 (0.44) (0.90) (0.46) 
OPCFTA -0.923 -1.043 -0.951 
 (0.15) (0.29) (0.42) 
LEVERAGE 0.031 -0.142 -0.091 
 (0.81) (0.59) (0.83) 
BOARDSIZE 0.045 0.003 -0.032 
 (0.28) (0.96) (0.64) 
BOARDIND -0.756 1.360 -1.850 
 (0.60) (0.49) (0.37) 
OWNERSHIP -0.303 -0.981 4.962 
 (0.68) (0.46) (0.14) 
INTERCEPT -1.065 2.759 6.105* 
 (0.67) (0.33) (0.07) 
YEAR YES YES YES 
INDUSTRY YES YES YES 
N 168 155 129 














Table 9 Regression results for the impact of corruption events on short-term post-M&A performance for firms with longer-term 
connections with corrupt bureaucrats.  
The table presents the regression results for the impact of corruption events on short-term post-M&A performance for firms which have longer-term connections 
with corrupt bureaucrats. In columns 1 to 3, the sample only includes the deals announced by firms that establish connections with corrupt bureaucrats one year 
before the announcement of M&As. In columns 4 to 6 and 7 to 9, the sample only includes the deals announced by firms that establish connections with corrupt 
bureaucrats two and three years before the announcement of M&As, respectively. The dependent variable is post-M&A performance measured by CARs for 
three-day, five-day and 11-day windows (CAR (-1, 1), CAR (-2, 2) and CAR (-5, 5)). ‘CORRUPTION’ is a dummy variable that equals one if a firm is a related 
firm, and zero otherwise. ‘POST’ is a dummy variable that is equal to one if the observation is obtained after the year of the corruption event, otherwise zero. 
‘CORP*POST’ is the interaction between ‘CORRUPTION’ and ‘POST’.  Definition of control variables is in Appendix B and the standard errors are clustered 
by firm to account for any possible correlations between firms. Standardized beta coefficients; p-values in parentheses. *, **, *** represent significance at 10%, 
5% and 1% levels, respectively. 
  Connection established one year before Connection established two years before Connection established three years before 
  CAR (-1, 1) CAR (-2, 2) CAR (-5, 5) CAR (-1, 1) CAR (-2, 2) CAR (-5, 5) CAR (-1, 1) CAR (-2, 2) CAR (-5, 5) 
CORRUPTION  0.053 0.052** -0.010 0.055 0.053** -0.012 0.056 0.049** -0.019 
 (0.11) (0.03) (0.72) (0.11) (0.03) (0.68) (0.12) (0.04) (0.52) 
POST 0.015 0.029** 0.048** 0.015 0.029** 0.048** 0.015 0.030** 0.048** 
 (0.20) (0.04) (0.01) (0.21) (0.04) (0.01) (0.21) (0.04) (0.01) 
CORP*POST -0.119** -0.135*** -0.082* -0.126** -0.144*** -0.088* -0.128** -0.141*** -0.082* 
 (0.01) (0.00) (0.07) (0.01) (0.00) (0.06) (0.01) (0.00) (0.08) 
RELATIVE SIZE 0.012*** 0.016*** 0.023*** 0.012*** 0.016*** 0.023*** 0.012*** 0.017*** 0.024*** 
 (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
CASH PAYMENT -0.037* -0.059** -0.076** -0.037* -0.060** -0.078** -0.037* -0.059** -0.077** 
 (0.09) (0.03) (0.02) (0.09) (0.03) (0.01) (0.09) (0.03) (0.01) 
SIZE 0.002 0.012** 0.030*** 0.003 0.013** 0.031*** 0.002 0.014** 0.032*** 
 (0.64) (0.04) (0.00) (0.59) (0.03) (0.00) (0.63) (0.01) (0.00) 
Q 0.008 0.016*** 0.031*** 0.008* 0.017*** 0.032*** 0.008 0.017*** 0.032*** 
 (0.11) (0.01) (0.00) (0.10) (0.01) (0.00) (0.10) (0.01) (0.00) 
OPCFTA 0.024 0.025 -0.106 0.024 0.025 -0.104 0.025 0.011 -0.117* 
 (0.56) (0.62) (0.11) (0.55) (0.62) (0.12) (0.54) (0.82) (0.08) 
LEVERAGE -0.013 -0.023 -0.033 -0.012 -0.022 -0.032 -0.012 -0.021 -0.032 
 (0.36) (0.16) (0.27) (0.39) (0.18) (0.28) (0.39) (0.18) (0.27) 
56 
 
BOARDSIZE -0.006 -0.003 0.004 -0.006 -0.004 0.003 -0.006 -0.005 0.002 
 (0.16) (0.39) (0.47) (0.16) (0.35) (0.55) (0.16) (0.22) (0.73) 
BOARDIND 0.044 0.048 0.115 0.042 0.045 0.109 0.039 0.044 0.103 
 (0.60) (0.59) (0.38) (0.62) (0.61) (0.40) (0.64) (0.62) (0.43) 
OWNERSHIP 0.061 0.062 0.030 0.047 0.049 0.015 0.045 0.057 0.024 
 (0.17) (0.25) (0.62) (0.32) (0.38) (0.78) (0.34) (0.30) (0.66) 
INTERCEPT 0.318 -0.019 -0.777*** 0.312 -0.028 -0.781*** 0.316 -0.049 -0.798*** 
 (0.31) (0.93) (0.00) (0.31) (0.89) (0.00) (0.31) (0.82) (0.00) 
YEAR YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES 
INDUSTRY YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES 
N 377 377 377 373 373 373 370 370 370 








Table 10 Regression results for the impact of corruption events on firms’ post-M&A 
performance stratified by different firm performance. 
This table presents the regression results for the impact of corruption events on firms’ post-M&A 
performance in the subsamples alternately stratified by firm performance. The sample is partitioned 
alternately by the sample median value of firm return on equity (ROE) and Tobin’s Q. The ‘Low’ and 
‘High’ subsamples refer to the firm having ROE or Tobin’s Q lower and higher than the sample median 
value, respectively. The dependent variable is post-M&A performance measured by CARs for three-
day, five-day and 11-day windows (CAR (-1, 1), CAR (-2, 2) and CAR (-5, 5)). ‘CORRUPTION’ is a 
dummy variable that equals one if a firm is a related firm, and zero otherwise. ‘POST’ is a dummy 
variable that is equal to one if the observation is obtained after the year of the corruption event, 
otherwise zero. ‘CORP*POST’ is the interaction between ‘CORRUPTION’ and ‘POST’.  Definition of 
control variables is in Appendix B, and the standard errors are clustered by firm to account for any 
possible correlations between firms. Standardized beta coefficients; p-values in parentheses. *, **, *** 
represent significance at 10%, 5% and 1% levels, respectively. 
Panel A Firm performance: Firm return on equity (ROE) 
  Low High Low High Low High 











CORRUPTION  0.031 0.016 0.073** 0.022 0.071 0.015 
 (0.16) (0.23) (0.03) (0.21) (0.12) (0.49) 
POST 0.054*** -0.001 0.067*** 0.010 0.035 0.055** 
 (0.00) (0.92) (0.01) (0.57) (0.33) (0.02) 
CORP*POST -0.073** -0.084*** -0.121*** -0.110*** -0.126** -0.125*** 
 (0.01) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.02) (0.00) 
RELATIVE SIZE 0.017*** 0.012 0.020*** 0.012 0.044*** -0.010 
 (0.00) (0.12) (0.00) (0.14) (0.00) (0.31) 
CASH PAYMENT 0.006 -0.045* -0.012 -0.069** 0.018 -0.115*** 
 (0.81) (0.08) (0.76) (0.03) (0.76) (0.00) 
SIZE 0.001 0.008 -0.008 0.019*** -0.003 0.020** 
 (0.93) (0.13) (0.59) (0.00) (0.87) (0.04) 
Q 0.004 0.014*** 0.010 0.022*** 0.001 0.029*** 
 (0.53) (0.01) (0.24) (0.00) (0.91) (0.00) 
OPCFTA -0.097** 0.006 -0.106 0.036 -0.170* 0.065 
 (0.01) (0.90) (0.14) (0.57) (0.09) (0.40) 
LEVERAGE -0.104** -0.006 -0.112** -0.006 -0.138 0.021 
 (0.01) (0.73) (0.04) (0.68) (0.11) (0.31) 
BOARDSIZE -0.003 -0.003 0.003 -0.006 -0.002 -0.001 
 (0.42) (0.48) (0.53) (0.25) (0.71) (0.91) 
BOARDIND 0.169* 0.144 0.146 0.073 0.114 0.057 
 (0.06) (0.17) (0.19) (0.63) (0.53) (0.79) 
OWNERSHIP -0.015 0.062 0.016 0.069 0.016 0.064 
 (0.81) (0.27) (0.81) (0.38) (0.87) (0.35) 
INTERCEPT 0.029 1.596*** 0.153 0.683*** 0.007 -1.363*** 
 (0.88) (0.00) (0.54) (0.00) (0.98) (0.00) 
YEAR YES YES YES YES YES YES 
INDUSTRY YES YES YES YES YES YES 
N 135 248 135 248 135 248 




Panel B Firm performance: Tobin’s Q 
  Low High Low High Low High 











CORRUPTION  0.032* 0.015 0.046* 0.031 0.092** 0.011 
 (0.07) (0.37) (0.09) (0.20) (0.01) (0.69) 
POST 0.026 0.007 0.018 0.028* 0.013 0.049** 
 (0.25) (0.54) (0.48) (0.06) (0.67) (0.03) 
CORP*POST -0.074*** -0.074*** -0.104*** -0.109*** -0.147*** -0.119*** 
 (0.00) (0.00) (0.01) (0.00) (0.01) (0.01) 
RELATIVE SIZE -0.124 0.010** -0.188 0.013*** -0.153 0.025*** 
 (0.22) (0.01) (0.17) (0.01) (0.41) (0.00) 
CASH PAYMENT -0.019 -0.061** -0.033 -0.075** -0.046 -0.076* 
 (0.46) (0.02) (0.44) (0.04) (0.44) (0.05) 
SIZE 0.007 0.006 0.015* 0.012 0.014 0.038** 
 (0.28) (0.37) (0.06) (0.23) (0.28) (0.01) 
Q 0.021 0.011** 0.053 0.019*** 0.150* 0.034*** 
 (0.57) (0.03) (0.30) (0.01) (0.09) (0.00) 
OPCFTA -0.050 0.018 0.046 0.027 0.111 -0.109 
 (0.35) (0.69) (0.54) (0.71) (0.21) (0.18) 
LEVERAGE -0.062 -0.009 -0.087* -0.022 -0.088 -0.029 
 (0.13) (0.54) (0.09) (0.20) (0.31) (0.31) 
BOARDSIZE 0.002 -0.005 0.000 -0.002 0.005 -0.004 
 (0.47) (0.17) (1.00) (0.70) (0.65) (0.47) 
BOARDIND 0.120 0.105 0.130 0.045 0.320 -0.180 
 (0.12) (0.23) (0.28) (0.70) (0.23) (0.25) 
OWNERSHIP 0.016 0.071 0.040 0.052 -0.016 0.012 
 (0.75) (0.24) (0.47) (0.53) (0.83) (0.90) 
INTERCEPT 1.522*** 0.004 0.566*** -0.100 -1.645*** -0.549* 
 (0.00) (0.98) (0.00) (0.61) (0.00) (0.07) 
YEAR YES YES YES YES YES YES 
INDUSTRY YES YES YES YES YES YES 
N 155 228 155 228 155 228 
adj. R-sq 0.87 0.43 0.54 0.43 0.42 0.46 
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Table 11 The impact of corruption events on the short-term post-M&A performance of 
non-SOEs in regions with high and low corruption index 
This table presents the regression results for the impact of corruption events on firms’ short-term post-
M&A performance in regions with high and low corruption index. The dependent variable is post-M&A 
performance measured by CARs for three-day, five-day and 11-day windows (CAR (-1, 1), CAR (-2, 
2) and CAR (-5, 5)). ‘CORRUPTION’ is a dummy variable that is equal to one if a firm is a related 
firm, and zero otherwise. ‘POST’ is a dummy variable that is equal to one if the observation is obtained 
after the year of the corruption event, otherwise zero. The ‘Low’ and ‘High’ subsamples refer to the 
firm locates in the providence has corruption index which is lower and higher than the sample median 
value, respectively. The standard errors are clustered by firm to account for any possible correlations 
between firms. Standardized beta coefficients; p-values in parentheses. *, **, *** represent significance 
at 10%, 5% and 1% levels, respectively. 
  High  Low High  Low High  Low 











CORRUPTION  0.062** 0.011 0.054* 0.024 -0.024 0.021 
 (0.05) (0.54) (0.10) (0.32) (0.50) (0.46) 
POST 0.017 0.006 0.045* 0.009 0.075** 0.017 
 (0.52) (0.63) (0.06) (0.49) (0.01) (0.36) 
CORP*POST -0.157*** -0.070*** -0.168*** -0.090*** -0.088 -0.077** 
 (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.12) (0.04) 
RELATIVE SIZE 0.014* 0.011* 0.016*** 0.019** 0.018** 0.032*** 
 (0.07) (0.06) (0.01) (0.02) (0.05) (0.00) 
CASH PAYMENT -0.016 -0.037 -0.037 -0.055 -0.082** -0.070 
 (0.62) (0.40) (0.25) (0.36) (0.03) (0.32) 
SIZE 0.005 -0.006 0.020** -0.012 0.041*** -0.006 
 (0.64) (0.39) (0.02) (0.22) (0.00) (0.61) 
Q 0.008 0.005 0.025** 0.003 0.042*** 0.010 
 (0.49) (0.33) (0.02) (0.73) (0.00) (0.24) 
OPCFTA 0.033 -0.035 -0.007 0.016 -0.085 -0.048 
 (0.75) (0.36) (0.94) (0.74) (0.48) (0.45) 
LEVERAGE -0.027 0.013 -0.033* 0.018 -0.042 0.046 
 (0.25) (0.69) (0.06) (0.55) (0.12) (0.19) 
BOARDSIZE -0.013* 0.001 -0.010 0.008* 0.014* 0.005 
 (0.06) (0.72) (0.14) (0.08) (0.08) (0.37) 
BOARDIND -0.078 0.140 -0.132 0.142 0.202 0.034 
 (0.73) (0.19) (0.37) (0.30) (0.43) (0.83) 
OWNERSHIP 0.040 0.005 0.111 -0.036 0.122 -0.034 
 (0.75) (0.92) (0.17) (0.61) (0.39) (0.61) 
INTERCEPT 0.409* 0.095 -0.070 0.223 -1.158*** 0.119 
 (0.10) (0.53) (0.80) (0.24) (0.00) (0.63) 
F-test: equal  -0.087* -0.078* 0.011 
CORP*POST (0.07) (0.09) (0.36) 
YEAR YES YES YES YES YES YES 
INDUSTRY YES YES YES YES YES YES 
N 196 187 196 187 196 187 
adj. R-sq 0.24 0.40 0.37 0.40 0.36 0.45 
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Table 12 The impact of corruption events on the short-term post-M&A performance of non-SOEs across industries 
This table presents the regression results for the impact of corruption events on the short-term post-M&A performance of non-SOEs that operate in supported 
or non-supported industries (Panel A), highly competitive or less competitive industries (Panel B). In Panel A, the ‘Supported’ and ‘Non-supported’ subsamples 
refer to the firm belonging to government-supported industries and non-government-supported industries. In Panel B, the ‘High’ and ‘Low’ subsamples refer 
to the firm belonging to less competitive industries and highly competitive industries. The dependent variable is post-M&A performance measured by CARs 
for three-day, five-day and 11-day windows (CAR (-1, 1), CAR (-2, 2) and CAR (-5, 5)). ‘CORRUPTION’ is a dummy variable that is equal to one if a firm is 
a related firm, and zero otherwise. ‘POST’ is a dummy variable that is equal to one if the observation is obtained after the year of the corruption event, otherwise 
zero. The standard errors are clustered by firm to account for any possible correlations between firms. Standardized beta coefficients; p-values in parentheses. 
*, **, *** represent significance at 10%, 5% and 1% levels, respectively. 
Panel A Government-supported versus non-government-supported industries 
  Supported Non-supported Supported Non-supported Supported Non-supported 
  CAR (-1, 1) CAR (-1, 1) CAR (-2, 2) CAR (-2, 2) CAR (-5, 5) CAR (-5, 5) 
CORRUPTION  0.252** 0.008 0.209** 0.019 0.005 0.000 
 (0.01) (0.56) (0.05) (0.31) (0.97) (0.98) 
POST 0.069 0.014 0.054 0.031** 0.050 0.044** 
 (0.39) (0.23) (0.17) (0.04) (0.28) (0.04) 
CORP*POST -0.362*** -0.072*** -0.295** -0.107*** 0.004 -0.108*** 
 (0.01) (0.00) (0.04) (0.00) (0.98) (0.01) 
RELATIVE SIZE 0.182 0.013*** 0.166 0.017*** 0.012 0.026*** 
 (0.44) (0.00) (0.34) (0.00) (0.92) (0.00) 
CASH PAYMENT -0.006 -0.030 -0.045 -0.044 -0.139* -0.054 
 (0.95) (0.14) (0.51) (0.12) (0.06) (0.12) 
SIZE -0.002 0.006 0.025 0.012 0.066** 0.029** 
 (0.96) (0.27) (0.27) (0.12) (0.04) (0.02) 
Q 0.013 0.010** 0.029* 0.016** 0.034 0.029*** 
 (0.73) (0.03) (0.09) (0.01) (0.16) (0.00) 
OPCFTA -0.040 -0.011 -0.065 0.004 -0.203 -0.058 
 (0.94) (0.73) (0.78) (0.93) (0.49) (0.36) 
LEVERAGE 0.108 -0.008 -0.005 -0.021 -0.309* -0.029 
 (0.57) (0.55) (0.97) (0.22) (0.09) (0.34) 
BOARDSIZE -0.025 -0.003 -0.017 -0.001 0.011 0.001 
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 (0.15) (0.32) (0.16) (0.78) (0.45) (0.82) 
BOARDIND -0.201 0.096 0.196 0.047 0.795* -0.036 
 (0.74) (0.15) (0.58) (0.61) (0.05) (0.80) 
OWNERSHIP 0.115 0.112** 0.008 0.124** -0.054 0.040 
 (0.70) (0.04) (0.96) (0.04) (0.70) (0.57) 
INTERCEPT 0.475 -0.070 -0.335 -0.173 -1.553* -0.559** 
 (0.55) (0.53) (0.56) (0.27) (0.05) (0.04) 
F-test: equal  -0.290*** -0.188** 0.104 
CORP*POST (0.00) (0.03) (0.74) 
YEAR YES YES YES YES YES YES 
INDUSTRY YES YES YES YES YES YES 
N 76 307 76 307 76 307 
adj. R-sq 0.11 0.39 0.22 0.38 0.18 0.36 
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Panel B Highly competitive versus less competitive industries 
  High  Low High  Low High  Low 











CORRUPTION  0.012 0.138 0.019 0.108** 0.021 -0.061 
 (0.52) (0.12) (0.35) (0.05) (0.46) (0.13) 
POST 0.027* 0.011 0.049** 0.015 0.055** 0.038 
 (0.06) (0.58) (0.02) (0.41) (0.05) (0.19) 
CORP*POST -0.068*** -0.196** -0.087*** -0.199*** -0.085** -0.075 
 (0.00) (0.04) (0.00) (0.00) (0.04) (0.19) 
RELATIVE SIZE 0.015*** 0.015** 0.019*** 0.020*** 0.028*** 0.033*** 
 (0.00) (0.02) (0.00) (0.01) (0.00) (0.00) 
CASH PAYMENT -0.009 -0.044 -0.019 -0.068 -0.036 -0.087** 
 (0.77) (0.19) (0.58) (0.11) (0.45) (0.03) 
SIZE 0.001 0.005 0.007 0.008 0.020* 0.012 
 (0.90) (0.66) (0.37) (0.56) (0.05) (0.40) 
Q 0.010** -0.004 0.017** 0.001 0.034*** 0.008 
 (0.05) (0.68) (0.02) (0.91) (0.00) (0.53) 
OPCFTA -0.036 0.108 0.000 0.120 -0.017 -0.030 
 (0.49) (0.16) (1.00) (0.13) (0.84) (0.78) 
LEVERAGE 0.015 -0.088* 0.015 -0.079 0.014 -0.017 
 (0.51) (0.06) (0.40) (0.16) (0.46) (0.82) 
BOARDSIZE -0.004 -0.008 -0.003 -0.006 -0.006 0.014** 
 (0.38) (0.23) (0.56) (0.31) (0.24) (0.05) 
BOARDIND 0.284** -0.184 0.245** -0.185 0.158 0.042 
 (0.01) (0.13) (0.04) (0.11) (0.32) (0.84) 
OWNERSHIP -0.004 -0.001 -0.021 -0.009 0.146* -0.070 
 (0.96) (0.98) (0.86) (0.87) (0.09) (0.50) 
INTERCEPT -0.055 0.437 -0.178 0.216 -0.439* -0.475 
 (0.71) (0.36) (0.32) (0.54) (0.09) (0.12) 
F-test: equal  0.128* 0.112** -0.010 
CORP*POST (0.10) (0.03) (0.74) 
YEAR YES YES YES YES YES YES 
INDUSTRY YES YES YES YES YES YES 
N 206 175 206 175 206 175 
adj. R-sq 0.30 0.30 0.35 0.38 0.44 0.42 
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Table 13 Regression results for the impact of corruption events on firms’ post-M&A performance 
This table presents the regression results for the impact of corruption events on firms’ post-M&A performance in the subsamples alternately stratified by target 
firms’ ownership structure. The sample is partitioned alternately by whether the target firm is controlled by the state. The ‘SOE Target’ and ‘Non-SOE Target’ 
subsamples refer to the target firms being controlled by state and individual or private enterprises. The dependent variable is post-M&A performance measured 
by CARs for three-day, five-day and 11-day windows (CAR (-1, 1), CAR (-2, 2) and CAR (-5, 5)). ‘CORRUPTION’ is a dummy variable that equals one if a 
firm is a related firm, and zero otherwise. ‘POST’ is a dummy variable that is equal to one if the observation is obtained after the year of the corruption event, 
otherwise zero. ‘CORP*POST’ is the interaction between ‘CORRUPTION’ and ‘POST’.  Definition of control variables is in Appendix B, and the standard 
errors are clustered by firm to account for any possible correlations between firms. Standardized beta coefficients; p-values in parentheses. *, **, *** represent 
significance at 10%, 5% and 1% levels, respectively. 
  SOE Target  Non-SOE Target SOE Target  Non-SOE Target SOE Target  Non-SOE Target 
  CAR (-1, 1) CAR (-1, 1) CAR (-2, 2) CAR (-2, 2) CAR (-5, 5) CAR (-5, 5) 
CORRUPTION  0.04* 0.06 0.09** 0.05** 0.12** -0.02 
 (0.09) (0.12) (0.02) (0.05) (0.02) (0.50) 
POST 0.09* 0.01 0.13* 0.03* 0.14 0.05** 
 (0.09) (0.55) (0.10) (0.08) (0.12) (0.02) 
CORP*POST -0.21*** -0.13** -0.30*** -0.13*** -0.31** -0.06 
 (0.00) (0.02) (0.00) (0.00) (0.01) (0.21) 
RELATIVE SIZE 0.38 0.01*** 0.13 0.02*** -0.11 0.03*** 
 (0.28) (0.00) (0.84) (0.00) (0.87) (0.00) 
CASH PAYMENT 1.08 -0.03 0.22 -0.05* -0.46 -0.07** 
 (0.33) (0.23) (0.91) (0.07) (0.82) (0.03) 
SIZE 0.00 0.00 -0.02 0.02*** -0.01 0.03*** 
 (0.97) (0.47) (0.26) (0.00) (0.55) (0.00) 
Q 0.05** 0.01* 0.05 0.02*** 0.07* 0.03*** 
 (0.02) (0.08) (0.13) (0.01) (0.07) (0.00) 
OPCFTA -0.05 0.01 0.47* -0.00 0.33 -0.11 
 (0.70) (0.82) (0.07) (0.93) (0.16) (0.11) 
LEVERAGE 0.13* -0.02 0.11 -0.03* 0.16 -0.04 
 (0.09) (0.25) (0.34) (0.07) (0.17) (0.17) 
BOARDSIZE -0.00 -0.01* 0.02 -0.01* 0.02 0.00 
 (0.84) (0.07) (0.30) (0.10) (0.14) (0.93) 
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BOARDIND -0.31 0.01 -0.93* 0.00 -1.73** 0.08 
 (0.21) (0.93) (0.05) (0.97) (0.02) (0.53) 
OWNERSHIP 0.18 0.05 -0.14 0.07 0.02 0.04 
 (0.26) (0.33) (0.58) (0.25) (0.91) (0.48) 
INTERCEPT -1.20 0.35 0.18 -0.06 1.03 -0.88*** 
 (0.34) (0.29) (0.94) (0.80) (0.65) (0.00) 
F-test: equal  -0.08 -0.17** -0.25*** 
CORP*POST (0.24) (0.02) (0.01) 
YEAR YES YES YES YES YES YES 
INDUSTRY YES YES YES YES YES YES 
N 46 337 46 337 46 337 
adj. R-sq 0.52 0.27 0.48 0.38 0.50 0.38 
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Table 14 The regression results for the impact of corruption events on the likelihood that 
the M&A is financed by external funds 
This table presents logistic regression results for the impact of corruption events on the likelihood that 
the M&A deal is financed by external funds. The dependent variable ‘External Financing’ is binary 
where 1 signifies that the M&A deal is financed externally by bank loan, corporate bonds and shares, 
and zero signifies that the M&A is financed by the firm’s internal fund. ‘CORRUPTION’ is a dummy 
variable that is equal to one if a firm is a related firm, and zero otherwise. ‘POST’ is a dummy variable 
that is equal to one if the observation is obtained after the year of the corruption event, otherwise zero. 
‘CORP*POST’ is the interaction between ‘CORRUPTION’ and ‘POST’. Control variables are defined 
in Appendix B and the regression is clustered by firms. The value reported is the marginal effect of 
independent variables; p-values in parentheses. *, **, *** represent significance at 10%, 5% and 1% 
levels, respectively. 
  External Financing  







































Table 15 Regression results for the impact of corruption events on corporate investment 
of non-SOEs 
This table presents the regression results for the impact of corruption events on corporate investment 
expenditure of non-SOEs. ‘FULL’ includes all listed firms in the Shenzhen and Shanghai stock 
exchanges and ‘JURISDICTION’ only includes firms under corrupt bureaucrats’ jurisdiction. The 
dependent variable ‘CAPEXTA’ is the ratio of capital expenditure to total assets. ‘CORRUPTION’ is 
a dummy variable that is equal to one if a firm is a related firm, and zero otherwise. ‘POST’ is a dummy 
variable that is equal to one if the observation is obtained after the year of the corruption event, 
otherwise zero. The standard errors are clustered by firm to account for any possible correlations 
between firms. Standardized beta coefficients; p-values in parentheses. *, **, *** represent significance 
at 10%, 5% and 1% levels, respectively. 
  Corruption related sample Bureaucrats connecting sample 
 FULL JURISDICTION FULL JURISDICTION 
  CAPEXTA CAPEXTA CAPEXTA CAPEXTA 
CORRUPTIONt-1  0.013*** 0.016*** 0.015*** 0.017*** 
 (0.00) (0.01) (0.00) (0.01) 
POST t-1 -0.002 0.000 -0.002 0.000 
 (0.45) (0.93) (0.53) (0.93) 
CORRUPTION t-1*POST t-1 -0.012** -0.016*** -0.018*** -0.020*** 
 (0.04) (0.01) (0.00) (0.00) 
OPCFTAt-1 0.016 0.017 0.016 0.018 
 (0.10) (0.13) (0.10) (0.13) 
Qt-1 0.002* 0.001 0.002 0.001 
 (0.08) (0.20) (0.12) (0.20) 
LEVERAGEt-1 0.000 -0.000 0.000 -0.000 
 (0.28) (1.00) (0.35) (0.66) 
SIZEt-1 0.005*** 0.004** 0.004*** 0.003** 
 (0.00) (0.02) (0.00) (0.03) 
SEOt-1 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
 (0.38) (0.71) (0.45) (0.74) 
AGEt-1 -0.004*** -0.005*** -0.004*** -0.005*** 
 (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
INTERCEPT -0.022 0.024 -0.017 0.031 
 (0.46) (0.50) (0.57) (0.39) 
YEAR YES YES YES YES 
INDUSTRY YES YES YES YES 
N 3802 2899 3687 2850 
adj. R-sq 0.22 0.26 0.22 0.26 
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Table 16 Regression results for the impact of corruption events on the corporate investment efficiency of non-SOEs 
This table presents the regression results for the impact of corruption events on the corporate investment efficiency of non-SOEs. ‘FULL’ includes all listed 
firms in the Shenzhen and Shanghai stock exchanges and ‘JURISDICTION’ only includes firms under corrupt bureaucrats’ jurisdiction. ‘Before’ and ‘Post’ 
refer to the sample period before and after the corruption event. The dependent variable ‘CAPEXTA’ is the ratio of capital expenditure to total assets. 
‘CORRUPTION’ is a dummy variable that is equal to one if a firm is a related firm, and zero otherwise. ‘Q’ is Tobin’s Q measuring firms’ investment 
opportunity. ‘CORPt-1*Q t-1’ is the interaction between ‘CORRUPTIONt-1’ and ‘Q t-1’. The standard errors are clustered by firm to account for any possible 
correlations between firms. Standardized beta coefficients; p-values in parentheses. *, **, *** represent significance at 10%, 5% and 1% levels, respectively. 
  Corruption related sample Bureaucrats connecting sample 
 FULL JURISDICTION FULL JURISDICTION 
 Before  Post Before  Post Before  Post Before  Post 
  CAPEXTA CAPEXTA CAPEXTA CAPEXTA CAPEXTA CAPEXTA CAPEXTA CAPEXTA 
CORRUPTIONt-1  0.004 0.014** 0.026** 0.014** 0.006 0.013* 0.027** 0.012* 
 (0.73) (0.04) (0.02) (0.03) (0.64) (0.06) (0.02) (0.08) 
Q t-1 0.006*** 0.001 0.010** 0.001 0.006*** 0.001 0.010** 0.001 
 (0.01) (0.48) (0.01) (0.49) (0.01) (0.52) (0.01) (0.51) 
CORPt-1*Q t-1 0.008 -0.004** -0.007 -0.006*** 0.008 -0.005*** -0.006 -0.006*** 
 (0.25) (0.03) (0.30) (0.00) (0.29) (0.01) (0.41) (0.00) 
OPCFTAt-1 0.030 0.012 0.101*** 0.012 0.030 0.012 0.114*** 0.012 
 (0.24) (0.14) (0.00) (0.13) (0.25) (0.14) (0.00) (0.14) 
Leveraget-1 0.000 0.000* -0.003 0.000** 0.000 0.000 -0.003 0.000 
 (0.38) (0.07) (0.44) (0.02) (0.41) (0.26) (0.45) (0.19) 
SIZEt-1 0.007*** 0.004** 0.005** 0.003** 0.007*** 0.003** 0.005* 0.003* 
 (0.00) (0.01) (0.04) (0.04) (0.00) (0.05) (0.08) (0.05) 
SEOt-1 -0.000 0.000 -0.001 0.000 -0.000 0.000 -0.001 0.000 
 (0.81) (0.31) (0.26) (0.36) (0.79) (0.42) (0.21) (0.51) 
AGEt-1 -0.004*** -0.005*** -0.005*** -0.005*** -0.004*** -0.005*** -0.005*** -0.005*** 
 (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
INTERCEPT -0.072 0.021 -0.041 0.048 -0.078* 0.028 -0.024 0.033 
 (0.10) (0.62) (0.51) (0.25) (0.08) (0.45) (0.70) (0.41) 
YEAR YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES 
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INDUSTRY YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES 
N 1803 1999 1016 1883 1756 1931 997 1853 





Table 17 Regression results for the impact of corruption events on firms’ post-M&A 
performance in SOEs. 
This table presents the regression results for the impact of corruption events on firms’ post-M&A 
performance in SOEs. The dependent variable is short-term post-M&A performance measured by 
CARs for three-day, five-day and 11-day windows (CAR (-1, 1), CAR (-2, 2) and CAR (-5, 5)) and 
longer-term post-M&A long-term market performance measured by buy and hold stock returns for one-
year, two-year and three-year windows (BHAR1, BHAR 2 and BHAR3). ‘CORRUPTION’ is a dummy 
variable that is equal to one if a firm is a related firm, and zero otherwise. ‘POST’ is a dummy variable 
that is equal to one if the observation is obtained after the year of the corruption event, otherwise zero. 
‘CORP*POST’ is the interaction between ‘CORRUPTION’ and ‘POST’. Control variables are defined 
in Appendix B and the regression is clustered by firms. Standardized beta coefficients; p-values in 
parentheses. *, **, *** represent significance at 10%, 5% and 1% levels, respectively. 
  CAR (-1, 1) CAR (-2, 2) CAR (-5, 5) BHAR1 BHAR2 BHAR3 
CORRUPTION  0.002 0.016 0.021 -0.173 -0.151 0.241 
 (0.85) (0.35) (0.35) (0.32) (0.69) (0.60) 
POST 0.013 0.018 0.012 0.064 0.447 0.509 
 (0.22) (0.20) (0.50) (0.62) (0.32) (0.17) 
CORP*POST -0.014 -0.027 -0.030 0.248 0.041 -0.205 
 (0.43) (0.27) (0.33) (0.24) (0.93) (0.71) 
RELATIVE SIZE 0.047*** 0.077*** 0.069* -0.328 -0.788 0.396 
 (0.00) (0.00) (0.09) (0.11) (0.31) (0.59) 
CASH PAYMENT -0.080*** -0.091*** -0.094** -0.530** -0.995 -0.275 
 (0.00) (0.00) (0.01) (0.03) (0.13) (0.54) 
SIZE 0.007* 0.010* 0.009 -0.154** -0.518 -0.621* 
 (0.07) (0.07) (0.24) (0.05) (0.12) (0.06) 
Q 0.004 0.005 0.007 0.043 0.308 0.355 
 (0.36) (0.40) (0.42) (0.40) (0.16) (0.24) 
OPCFTA 0.059 0.061 0.070 1.138** -3.983 -3.207 
 (0.22) (0.35) (0.39) (0.01) (0.27) (0.16) 
LEVERAGE -0.010 -0.022 -0.108*** 1.489* 5.981 7.646 
 (0.67) (0.43) (0.01) (0.10) (0.17) (0.13) 
BOARDSIZE -0.003 -0.004 -0.004 -0.002 0.087 0.092 
 (0.11) (0.12) (0.34) (0.94) (0.29) (0.28) 
BOARDIND -0.117 -0.113 -0.109 -0.245 2.164 0.127 
 (0.15) (0.21) (0.33) (0.66) (0.38) (0.95) 
OWNERSHIP -0.138 -0.402 -1.386 -0.468 29.443 13.895 
 (0.80) (0.72) (0.21) (0.94) (0.21) (0.26) 
INTERCEPT 0.033 0.016 0.055 3.708*** 8.109* 7.812* 
 (0.66) (0.88) (0.70) (0.00) (0.06) (0.06) 
YEAR YES YES YES YES YES YES 
INDUSTRY YES YES YES YES YES YES 
N 419 419 419 401 324 243 





Appendix A. A list of corruption events involving high-level bureaucrats in China from 2005 to 2011 
Name  Announcement date Province Duty 
Zhang Enzhao 15 March 2005 Bank Chairman of China Construction Bank, member of Central Committee for Discipline Inspection 
Wang Youjie 28 August 2005 Henan Vice-Chairman of NPC in Henan province 
Huang Songyou 15 October 2005 Central  Vice-President of the Supreme People's Court 
Zhu Zuoyong  19 December 2005 Gansu  Vice-Chairman of the CPPCC in Gansu province 
Liu Zhihua 9 June 2006 Beijing Vice-Governor of Beijing 
He Minxu 22 June 2006 Anhui Vice-Governor of Anhui province 
Wang Wulong 13 July 2006 Jiangsu Vice-CPC Secretary of Jiangsu Province 
Pang Jianyu 15 September 2006 Shanxi Vice-Chairman of the CPPCC in Shanxi province 
Chen Liangyu 24 September 2006 Shanghai  Secretary of CPC in Shanghai 
Liu Weiming 22 January 2007 Guangdong Vice-Governor of Guangdong province, Vice-Chairman of the CPPCC in Guangdong Province 
Du Shicheng  18 April 2007 Shandong Vice-CPC secretary of Shandong Province 
Song Pingshun 3 June 2007 Tianjin Vice-CPC secretary of Tianjin 
Chen Shaoyong  8 August 2008 Fujian Secretary-general of the CPC in Fujian province 
Wang Huayuan 16 April 2009 Zhejiang Secretary of CPC in Zhejiang province 
Chen Shaoji 24 April 2009 Guangdong Chairman of CPPCC in Guangdong province 
Pi Qiansheng 17 June 2009 Tianjin Member of Standing Committee of CPC in Tianjin 
Song Yong 13 October 2009 Liaoning Vice-Chairman of NPC in Liaoning province 
Li Tangtang 15 October 2009 Ningxia Vice-Governor of Ningxia Municipality 
Huang Yao  24 October 2009 Guizhou  Chairman of the CPPCC in Guizhou province 
Sun Shuyi 17 December 2009 Shandong Chairman of the CPPCC in Shandong province 
Liu Jiameng 3 April 2010 Zhejiang Vice-Chairman of NPC in Zhejiang province 
Zhang Jiameng 3 April 2010 Zhejiang Vice-Chairman of NPC in Zhejiang province 
Song Chenguang 10 July 2010 Jiangxi Vice-Chairman of the CPPCC in Jiangxi province 
Liu Zhuozhi 15 December 2010 Neimengguo Vice-Governor of Neimengguo Municipality 
Tian Xueren 5 November 2011 Jilin Member of Standing Committee of CPC Jilin, Executive Vice-Governor of Jilin Province 
Huang Sheng 24 November 2011 Shandong Vice-Governor of Shandong province 
Sun Yu November 2007 Guangxi Vice-Governor of Guangxi Zhuang Autonomous Region 
Zhu Zhigang October 2008 Central  Deputy Finance Minister 
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Wang Zhaoyao September 2005 Anhui Vice-CPC Secretary of Anhui province 
 
 
Appendix B Variable definition  
Variable name  Detailed definition 
Related firm dummy (CORRUPTION) The dummy variable equals 1 if a firm is a related firm and 0 otherwise. 
Post event dummy (POST) The dummy equals 1 if the observation is obtained after the year of the corruption event, otherwise 0.  
Merger and acquisition dummy (MA)  The dummy equals 1 if the firm announced a merger and acquisition, and 0 otherwise.   
Bureaucrat’s jurisdiction dummy 
(JURISDICTION) The dummy equals 1 if the firms locate in the corrupt bureaucrats’ jurisdictions, and 0 otherwise.  
3-days CARs (CAR_1)  The cumulative abnormal return over a three-day event window from one day before the M&A announcement to one day after the announcement.  
5-days CARs (CAR_2) The cumulative abnormal return over a five-day event window from two days before the M&A announcement to two days after the announcement.  
11-days CARs (CAR_5) The cumulative abnormal return over an 11-day event window from five days before the M&A announcement to five days after the announcement.  
One year buy and hold return (BHAR1) The one-year post-M&A buy and hold return.  
Two years buy and hold return (BHAR2) The two-year post-M&A buy and hold return.  
Three years buy and hold return 
(BHAR3) The three-year post-M&A buy and hold return.  
Takeover premium (PREMIUM1) The ratio of trading value of the target on the estimated value minus one. 
Takeover premium (PREMIUM2) The natural logarithm of the difference between trading value of the target and the target estimated value. 
Local M&As dummy (LOCAL) The dummy equals 1 if the firm acquires a local target, and 0 otherwise. 
State owned target dummy (Target SOE) The dummy equals 1 if the target firm is controlled by the state.  
External financing dummy (External 
Financing) 
The dummy equals 1 if the M&A deal is financed externally by bank loan, corporate bonds and shares, and 0 
otherwise.  
Capital expenditure (CAPEXTA) The ratio of cash payments for fixed assets, intangible assets and other long-term assets from the cash flow statement less the cash receipts from selling these assets to the total assets. 
Firm size (SIZE) The natural logarithm of book value of total assets. 
Tobin's Q (Q) Market value/replacement value. 
Return on equity (ROE) Net profit/total equity. 
Operation cash flow (OPCFTA) Total operation cash flow scaled by total assets. 
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Leverage ratio (LEVERAGE) The ratio of total debt to total assets 
Board size (BOARDSIZE) The total number of members on the board of directors. 
Board independent (BOARDIND) The ratio of the number of independent board members to the total number of board members. 
Manager's ownership (OWNERSHIP) The ratio of managers’ shareholding to the total shares outstanding 
Relative size (RELATIVE SIZE) The ratio of the acquisition trading value to acquiring firm’s total assets. 
Cash financed M&A (CASH 
PAYMENT) The dummy variable equals 1 if the merger and acquisition are financed entirely by cash and 0 otherwise.  
Long term connection dummy 1 
(Connection established one year before) 
The dummy equals 1 if the deals announced by firms that establish connections with corrupt bureaucrats one 
year before the announcement of M&As, and 0 otherwise (Variable for dividing Subsamples). 
Long term connection dummy 2 
(Connection established two years 
before) 
The dummy equals 1 if the deals announced by firms that establish connections with corrupt bureaucrats two 
year before the announcement of M&As, and 0 otherwise (Variable for dividing Subsamples). 
Long term connection dummy 3 
(Connection established three years 
before) 
The dummy equals 1 if the deals announced by firms that establish connections with corrupt bureaucrats three 
year before the announcement of M&As, and 0 otherwise (Variable for dividing Subsamples). 
Corruption index dummy (Corruption 
Index) 
The dummy equals 1 if the firm located in the province has corruption index that is higher than the sample 
median value, and 0 otherwise (Variable for dividing Subsamples). 
Government support industry dummy 
(Government Support) 
The dummy equals 1 if the firm operates in a supported industry outlined in the 11th five-year plan in a 
particular year, and 0 otherwise (Variable for dividing Subsamples). 
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